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TORT REFORM IN MISSISSIPPI:

AN APPRAISAL OF THE NEw LAW OF PRODUCTS LIABILITY,
PART fl*
Phillip L. Mclntosh**

I. INTRODUCTION
In 1993, the Mississippi legislature enacted the Mississippi Products Liability
Act [hereinafter the Act], the substantive portions of which became effective on
July 1, 1994.' PartI of this Article, previously published,2 discussed the purpose
of the new Act; the definitions of basic terms of art used in the Act - such as
"product,"3 including whether used products are covered by the Act,4 "manufacturer," "seller," and "unreasonably dangerous"; and the interests protected by the
Act. PartII of this article addresses the categories of defects forming the bases
of claims for damages created by the Act, the liability of sellers and manufacturers, defenses to products liability claims available under the Act, and indemnity
claims.
As noted in PartI, the purpose of the Act was to bring predictability, stability,
and fairness to the law of products liability in Mississippi.' PartI concluded that
much of this purpose is lost in the ambiguity of the Act, partly as a result of the
lack of definitions and partly as a result of a lack of clear expression of the coverage and intent of the Act.' Part II further demonstrates some of the weaknesses of the Act as adopted while analyzing how it both retains some common law
concepts as developed in Mississippi and changes others. A careful analysis of
the Act shows an urgent need for the legislature to again take up the subject of
products liability and to address the gaps, vagueness, and confusion created by
the Act in its current form.
* PART I of this Article appears in Volume 16, No. 2, of the MississiPpi COLLEGE LAW REVIEW.
** Professor of Law, Mississippi College School of Law, Jackson, Mississippi. B.S., 1977, J.D., 1978,

Louisiana State University; LL.M. 1981, New York University. The work on this Article was supported in part
by a summer research grant from the Mississippi College School of Law.
1. Act of Feb. 18, 1993, H.B. 1270, 1993 Miss. Laws ch. 302 (codified at Miss. CODE ANN. § 11-1-63
(Supp. 1996)) [hereinafter the Act].
2. Phillip L. McIntosh, Tort Reform in Mississippi: An Appraisal of the New Law of Products Liability,
PART I, 16 Miss. C. L. REv. 393 (1996) [hereinafter PART I].
3. Id. at 400-10. Since the completion of PART I, the Mississippi Supreme Court in McIntyre v. Farrel
Corp., 680 So. 2d 858, 865 (1996), has held, in answering a question certified to it by the Fifth Circuit, that
MISS. CODE ANN. § 15-1-41 (1972) (a statute of repose for claims dealing with improvements to real property)
was not designed to protect equipment manufacturers as opposed to architects and contractors. The court thus
agreed with the position of this author with respect to the argument that the term "products" ought to include
fixtures and other manufactured items of personal property incorporated into real property for the purpose of
claims against manufacturers and other commercial distributors.
4. PART I, supra note 2, at 416-18. After completion of PART I, in Shumpert v. General Motors Corp., No.
CIV.A.l:95CV322-S-D., 1996 WL 408093, at*1 (N.D. Miss. Apr. 22, 1996), the court stated, in ruling on a
motion to amend plaintiff's complaint and to remand the case to state court, "This court does not read § 11-165 (sic) ...as excluding used car dealers from the 'manufacturer or product seller' language." Whether this is
a correct reading, given the reluctance of the courts in the past to apply strict products liability to used product
sellers, remains to be seen. See PART I, supra note 2, at 416-18.
5. PART I,
supra note 2, at 393.
6. PART I, supra note 2, at 436.
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II. CATEGORIES OF DEFECT

In setting forth the bases of liability for manufacturers and sellers, the Act creates four exclusive theories of recovery: (1) design defect; 7 (2) warnings or
instructions defect;' (3) deviation defect;' and (4) breach of express warranty."
According to the language of the Act, these theories govern all claims for damages except for claims for damages to the product itself. This article will address
each of these statutory theories in turn.
A. Design Defect

The Act provides that in a design defect claim, a manufacturer11 is not liable
unless the design of the product is both defective and unreasonably dangerous. 2
In most cases, the unreasonable danger presented by a product's design is the factor that makes the design defective. However, a defect in design may not necessarily be unreasonably dangerous. A product may not perform as intended by the
manufacturer because of a faulty design, but the faulty design may present no
13
unreasonable risk of harm.
The term "unreasonably dangerous," especially in the context of a design defect,
is a term of art. The product's design is unreasonably dangerous only if the plaintiff proves the required elements of a claim as set forth by the Act. In logical
sequence, these elements, which will be discussed in turn, are the following:
(1) The danger presented by the product's design was known or should have
been known to the manufacturer (i.e., the danger was foreseeable); 4
(2) the product failed to function as expected (as a result of a design characteristic); i
(3) an alternative design existed that would not impair the product's usefulness
or desirablity;16 and
7. Miss. CODE ANN.§ 11-1-63(a)(i)(3), (f) (Supp. 1996).
8. MIss. CODE ANN. § 11-1-63(a)(i)(2), (c) (Supp. 1996).
9. MISS. CODE ANN. § 11-1-63(a)(i)(1) (Supp. 1996).
10. MISS. CODE ANN. § 11-1 -63(a)(i)(4) (Supp. 1996).
11. The statute provides that liability for design defects may rest with the manufacturer or the nomnanufacturer seller. MIss. CODE ANN. § l 1-1-63(a), (c), (f)(Supp. 1996). Whether the seller is liable vicariously for
design defects created by the manufacturer and not known or reasonably knowable to the seller is an open question. See infra text accompanying notes 257-82. For purposes of facilitating discussion on the meaning of
defects under the Act, reference is made to the role of the manufacturer only.
12. MISS. CODE ANN. § 11-1-63(a)(i)(3), (ii) (Supp. 1996).
13. For example, a product intended to produce bubbles may be poorly formulated so that it does not produce adequate bubbles. The design may be said to be defective. However, its poor performance because of a
defective design does not make the product unreasonably dangerous. See Patterson v. F.W Woolworth Co., 786
F.2d 874, 878 (8th Cir. 1986) (Iowa law requires proof both of defect and unreasonable danger created by the
defect).
14. MISS. CODE. ANN. § 11-1-63(0(i) (Supp. 1996). The Act provides: "The manufacturer or seller knew, or
in light of reasonably available knowledge or in the exercise of reasonable care should have known, about the
danger that caused the damage for which recovery is sought... ."Id.
15. MISS. CODE ANN. § 11-1-63(f)(ii) (Supp. 1996). The Act provides: "The product failed to function as
expected... " Id.
16. Id. The Act provides: "[T]here existed a feasible design alternative that would have to a reasonable
probability prevented the harm. A feasible design alternative is a design that would have to a reasonable probability prevented the harm without impairing the utility, usefulness, practicality or desirability of the product to
users or consumers." Id.
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(4) the alternative design would have to a reasonable probability prevented the
harm."
In the event that the plaintiff proves each of these elements, he must also prove
that the defect existed at the time the product left the manufacturer's control 8
and that it proximately caused the injury. 9
1. Foreseeability as an Element of Design Defect
a. Law Prior to the Act
Under the Act, the plaintiff must prove that the manufacturer knew or should
have known of the danger presented by the design of the product.20 In other
words, the danger must have been foreseeable to the manufacturer. The requirement of foreseeability changes the law governing proof of design defect. Under
the law prior to the Act, foreseeability was not an element of the plaintiff's case.
In State Stove Manufacturing Co. v. Hodges,2 the Mississippi Supreme Court
first announced the adoption of strict liability theory in product liability cases.
In adopting Section 402A of the Restatement (Second) of Torts, 22 the court stated, "[i]f the article left the defendant's control in a dangerously unsafe condition,
or was not reasonably safe, or was unsafe for its intended use, the defendant is
liable whether or not he was at fault in creating that condition, or in failing to
discover and eliminate it."' 23 The court noted that, under a strict liability

approach, the plaintiff does not need to prove defendant's negligence in creating
the unsafe condition of the product or that the defendant was aware of it. 24 Thus,

under the prior law, foreseeability of the danger was irrelevant.
Since the adoption of Section 402A by the court in State Stove, the court has
repeatedly affirmed its commitment to strict liability theory in defective design
cases. For example, in the 1973 case of Hamilton Fixture Co. v. Anderson,25 the
court found that even though the evidence indicated that the manufacturer "exercised reasonable care in the design and installation" of the product and that the
"design of installation" resulted from a deliberate, prudent, and reasonable calculation, the manufacturer was nevertheless strictly liable.26
The 1985 case of Toliver v. General Motors Corp.27 provides the most detailed
analysis of the court's view of strict liability in a products design case as distinguished from a negligence claim prior to the adoption of a risk-utility analysis in
17. Id.
18. MISS. CODE ANN. § 11-1-63(a) (Supp. 1996). The Act provides: "The manufacturer or seller of the
product shall not be liable if the claimant does not prove by the preponderance of the evidence that at the time
the product left the control of the manufacturer or seller...." Id.
19. MISS. CODE ANN. § 11-l-63(a)(iii) (Supp. 1996). The Act provides: "The defective and unreasonably
dangerous condition of the product proximately caused the damages for which recovery is sought." Id.
20. MISS. CODE ANN. § I l-l-63(f)(i) (Supp. 1996).
21. 189 So. 2d 113 (Miss. 1966).
22. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A (1965).
23. State Stove, 189 So. 2dat 120-21.
24. Id. at 121.
25. 285 So. 2d 744 (Miss. 1973).
26. Id. at 747.
27. 482 So. 2d 213 (Miss. 1985).
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28
In Toliver, the court dealt with a claim of
Sperry-New Holland v. Prestage.
defective design of an automobile fuel tank. The court pointed out that under a
negligence standard, an engineer's design choice for an automobile fuel tank
would be evaluated considering aerodynamics, cost, and industry standards.
However, under a strict liability standard, such factors would be irrelevant.29 The
jury should consider not whether the design choice was reasonable, but whether
the product was unreasonably dangerous. 3' The court explicitly rejected the view
that design cases should be decided on negligence principles. 1 Despite this
seeming repudiation of negligence principles in strict liability cases, the Toliver
Court stated that the plaintiff may introduce evidence of deviation from industry
standards or show feasibility of alternative designs. 32 Presumably, such evidence
would be admissible for the purpose of proving a consumer's expectation regarding the safety of the product, even though such evidence would be typical of a
negligence claim or a strict liability claim using a Wade risk-utility analysis. 3
Three years after Toliver the court decided Hall v. Mississippi Chemical
Express. 4 In Hall, the court reiterated that in a strict liability case the focus is
not on the manufacturer's fault or lack of fault.35 Close on the heels of Hall
came Whittley v. City of Meridian36 in which the court emphasized that it is the
danger-in-fact, not the foreseeability of the danger, that is the focus of a strict liability claim.3 7
38
the court explicitly
In the 1993 case of Sperry-New Holland v. Prestage,
rejected the consumer expectations test in determining whether a product is
unreasonably dangerous in favor of the risk-utility test advocated by Dean
Wade.39 However, the court continued to insist that the fault of the manufacturer
need not be proved.40 Foreseeability of the danger by the manufacturer is not
among the factors that Dean Wade enumerated in his famous 1973 law review
article.41 The imputation of the manufacturer's knowledge of the danger is the
only theoretical distinction between negligence and a strict liability approach
using a risk-utility test.42
This apparently strong and consistent commitment by the court to strict liability insofar as the lack of any foreseeability requirement, however, may have been

28. 617 So. 2d. 248 (Miss. 1993).
29. Toliver, 482 So. 2d at 218.
30. Id.
31. Id.
32. Id.
33. See infra text accompanying notes 142-44 (discussing the Wade risk-utility test).
34. 528 So. 2d 796 (Miss. 1988).
35. Id. at 799. Hall is also significant for the fact that the court for the first time implicitly suggested a
shift from a consumer expectations test to a risk-utility analysis in determining whether a product's design is
unreasonably dangerous. Id.
36. 530 So. 2d 1341 (1988).
37. Id. at 1347. As in Hall, the Whittley Court used language consistent with a isk-utility approach to evaluating whether a product is unreasonably dangerous, without expressly rejecting the consumer expectations
approach used by the court since State Stove Mfg. Co. v. Hodges, 189 So. 2d 113 (Miss. 1966). Id.
38. 617 So. 2d 248 (Miss. 1993).
39. Id. at 256.
40. Id. at 253.
41. John W Wade, On the Nature of Strict ProductsLiability, 44 Miss. L.J. 825, 839-40 (1973).
42. James A. Henderson, Jr., Renewed Judicial Controversy over Defective Product Design: Toward the
Preservationof an Emerging Consensus, 63 MINN. L. REv. 773, 803 (1979).
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substantially weakened in the recent case of Cooper v. General Motors Corp.4"
Cooper involved a claim for injuries to the plaintiff in a car accident."' The
plaintiffs claimed that a 1984 model car was defectively designed because it was
not equipped with an airbag that would have prevented plaintiffs' decedent's
death.4 In refusing to impose liability for not installing an airbag on a 1984
model car, the court stated, "[t]he principles of law should not overlook the need
for scientific development or bring manufacturers to their knees for choosing one
restraint over another, in light of what was known to them at the time of their
46
manufacturing.
The examination of what was known to the manufacturer at the time of manufacture in evaluating design choices sounds in negligence. The language in
Cooper seems to go beyond the risk-utility analysis adopted in Prestage. The
Cooper Court evaluated the choice between design options based on the knowledge of the manufacturer at the time of manufacture rather than based on the
imputed knowledge of the danger presented by the product as designed. If, as
seems likely, the court means that design choices are evaluated in light of known
risks and safety effects of various alternative design choices, then strict liability
has effectively ceased to exist in Mississippi, even for pre-Act cases still pend47
ing.
In summary, under the pre-Act law governing design defects, foreseeability of
the risk of harm was regarded as irrelevant to the plaintiff's claim. However,
after Cooper,serious questions exist as to whether the supreme court has actually
abandoned a real notion of strict liability for design, even apart from the new
Act.
b. Foreseeability After the Act
In contrast to the law prior to 1994, the Act specifically requires the plaintiff to
prove that the defendant "knew, or in the light of reasonably available knowledge
or in the exercise of reasonable care should have known" of the danger that
caused the damage.48 Thus, foreseeability of the danger is now an element of the
plaintiff's case. This requirement clearly changes the law of Mississippi as it
existed prior to the Act and moves the law away from strict liability toward negligence.49 This change is particularly apparent since the court, over the years, has
repeatedly emphasized the point that the fault or lack of fault of the manufacturer
and the foreseeability of the danger are not at issue in a strict liability design
43. No. 92-CA-01334-SCT, 1996 WL 272362 (Miss. May 23, 1996).
44. Id. at *1.
45. Id.
46. Id. at*18.
47. Professor Harges argues that the Act does not change the nature of strict liability in design cases. Bobby
M. Harges, An Evaluation of the Mississippi Products Liability Act of 1993, 63 Miss. L.J. 697, 712 (1994).
However, if Cooper represents a departure from strict liability under the common law of Mississippi, the court
is not likely to find strict liability in a design case under the new Act. MIss. CODE ANN. § 11-1-63 (Supp.
1996).
48. Miss. CODE ANN. § I I-1-63(f)(i) (Supp. 1996).
49. Exactly how far the Act moves the law and whether any significant difference remains between traditional negligence and the theory underlying the Act will depend on the interpretation of requirements pertaining to
alternate design. See infra text accompanying notes 158-92.
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case."0 Under the risk-utility approach adopted in Prestage, the imputation of
knowledge of the danger back to the time of manufacture is the key factor that
distinguishes that approach from traditional negligence.51
Because the Act requires the plaintiff to show that the manufacturer knew or
should have known of the danger in a design case, 2 the Act permits the plaintiff
to prove that the manufacturer failed adequately to research or test the design
prior to commercial production. For example, a new design may create a danger
that is not discovered by the manufacturer because the manufacturer failed reasonably to test the product or because the manufacturer failed to keep up with
reasonably available technological advances. Proof of this failure by the plaintiff
would support recovery even if the manufacturer did not actually know of the
danger. However, if a danger created by a product's design was undiscoverable in
light of reasonably available technology, the plaintiff's claim of defective design
will fail.
While the Act clearly changes the rules on proof of a design defect by requiring proof of foreseeability, plaintiffs' attorneys are not likely to alter significantly
the manner in which they present cases to juries. Most reported design defect
cases involve alternative claims of negligence and strict liability.5 3 Thus, foreseeability is an element that plaintiffs have sought to establish in most design cases
even when the cases were brought under a strict liability theory. In most cases in
which negligence is alleged along with strict liability, plaintiffs' counsel expect
to be able to prove the elements of negligence, including foreseeability.
However, as demonstrated by Hamilton, 4 occasionally the plaintiff has succeeded in strict liability where the alternative negligence claim failed. In
Hamilton, the court explicitly recognized the reasonableness of the design choices made by the manufacturer, implying that the danger was not reasonably foreseeable.55 Nevertheless, the court found that the product was unreasonably dangerous and the manufacturer was liable. 6
c. Policy Issues
The Act's foreseeability requirement clearly is more favorable to the manufacturer in a design case. One of the functions of strict liability is to relieve the
plaintiff of the burden of proving foreseeability and reasonableness of the design
because the plaintiff often has less access to the information necessary to prove
the negligence of the manufacturer and courts believe this to be an unfair disad50. See supra text accompanying notes 20-47.
51. Miss. CODE ANN. § 11-1-63(f)(i) (Supp. 1996).
52. Sperry-New Holland v. Prestage, 617 So. 2d 248, 253 (Miss. 1993). The court stated: "In a 'risk- utility'
analysis, a product is 'unreasonably dangerous' if a reasonable person would conclude that the danger-in-fact,
whether foreseeable or not, outweighs the utility of the product. Id. See also Henderson, supra note 42, at 803.
53. E.g., Prestage, 617 So. 2d at 250.
54. Hamilton Fixtures Co. v. Anderson, 285 So. 2d 744 (Miss. 1973).
55. Id. at 747.
56. Id.
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vantage.

7

In theory, the foreseeability requirement serves to make the plaintiff's

burden more difficult.
Another argument advanced for the elimination of foreseeability in design cases
is the contention that strict liability encourages manufacturers to go beyond customary practices in search of better and safer products."8 If manufacturers can
rely on existing knowledge or reason to know at the time of manufacture, they
may be discouraged from seeking new and improved ways to design products.5 9
However, strong arguments exist that support a foreseeability requirement.
Because unforeseeable risks are by definition unpredictable, manufacturers
would find it difficult, if not impossible, to obtain adequate insurance or to

establish adequate self-insurance reserves.6 0 While proponents of strict liability
argue that manufacturers will invest more effort to discover and eliminate design
dangers, opponents point out that such increased investment in safety is a matter
of guess-work.

1

If a risk is unforeseeable, the manufacturer does not know

where to direct its research efforts to prevent such a risk.
Opponents of strict liability argue that it is an inefficient method of providing

insurance against unforeseeable injuries.62 Providing insurance to product users
through the legal process is expensive and wasteful. For example, much of the

award to compensate the plaintiff for an unforeseeable injury typically goes to
cover litigation expenses and attorney fees. Product costs for the vast majority of
users who are not injured will increase, in part, because of the inefficiency of the

tort system as a system of social insurance.6'
Perhaps the most fundamental argument in favor of a foreseeability requirement is the lack of fairness to the defendant who is held liable without fault.
Imposition of liability for unforeseeable risks does not allow a manufacturer to

be judged by a standard of normative behavior to which the manufacturer can
reasonably conform. 4 Professor Owen, a strong opponent of strict liability in
design claims, has argued that "tort law [must] have a moral center" which
serves to "promote human freedom, to the extent it can do so without undue
cost."6 Strict liability, however, is a loss shifting mechanism, without any intrin-

sic moral value.66
57. Aaron D. Twerski & Alvin S. Weinstein, A Critique of the Uniform Product Liability Law - a Rush to
Judgment, 18 DRAKE L. REV. 221, 228 (1978-79); Jerry J. Phillips, Achilles Heel, 61 TENN. L. REv. 1265, 1274
(1994).
58. See Phillips v Kimwood Mach. Co., 525 P2d 1033, 1041-42 (Or. 1994).
59. Phillips, supra note 57, at 1274. See also Habecker v. Clark Equip. Co., 942 F.2d 210, 216 (3rd Cir.
1991); Gary T. Schwartz, Foreword: Understanding ProductsLiability, 67 CAL. L. REv. 435, 484 (1979),
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS:
FINAL DRAFT].

PRODUCTS LIABILITY, §2 cmt. a (Proposed Final Draft, 1997) [hereinafter

60. James A. Henderson, Jr., Revising Section 402A: The Limits of Tort as Social Insurance, 10 TouRO L.
REv. 107, 116 (1993).
61. FINAL DRAFT, supra note 59, §2 cmt. a.
62. E.g., Henderson, supra note 60, at 117-19.
63. Henderson, supra note 60, at 119-120; David G. Owen, The FaultPit, 26 GA. L. Rv. 703, 718 (1992).
64. Henderson, supra note 60, at 116.
65. Owen, supra note 63, at 719.
66. Owen, supra note 63, at 718. See also Sheila L. Birnbaum, Unmasking the Test for Design Defect:
From Negligence [to Warranty] to Strict Liability to Negligence, 33 VAND. L. REv. 593, 622 (1980). Birnbaum
observed regarding imputed knowledge of an unknowable danger that "[iut is questionable whether a criterion
for liability purportedly based on a notion of reasonableness can be justly and fairly applied when cognition of
risks is imposed as a matter of law rather than as a matter of fact." Id.
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A foreseeability requirement represents a change from the law as it existed
before 1994. However, the Act's foreseeability requirement is consistent with the
position taken in the Final Draft of the Restatement (Third) of Torts: Products
Liability and the bulk of recent scholarship on the subject.17 The change is not
so radical as it might first appear. Most cases tried under the pre-1994 law
involved negligence claims, and hence foreseeability of the risk. With the adoption of a risk-utility analysis, the change becomes even less radical, because in
the view of many commentators, the application of risk-utility is barely distinguishable from negligence.
2. The Product Failed to Function as Expected
The requirement that the plaintiff prove that the product failed to function as
expected is one of the most problematic aspects of the Act. Among the problems
created by this requirement is that the Act does not explicitly set out whose
expectation is controlling in evaluating the product's performance. Three possible interpretations are presented and evaluated here:
(1) product performance is to be evaluated in light of the subjective expectations of the actual user or consumer;
(2) product performance is to be evaluated in light of the knowledge common
to ordinary consumers and users; or
(3) product performance is to be evaluated in light of the expectations that a
reasonable, fully-informed consumer or user would have a right to expect with
regard to product safety.8
a. The Expectations of the Actual User or Consumer
The subjective expectations of the actual user or consumer are certainly within
the possible meanings of the phrase "failed to function as expected" as found in
the Act.69 However, the courts are unlikely to interpret the Act in such a manner.
Reliance on the subjective expectations of actual users or consumers as the basis
for determining product defectiveness has no history in the Mississippi cases.
Rather, prior to Prestage,7° the court followed a consumer expectations test rooted in the reasonable expectations of the ordinary consumer was followed.71
Moreover, a subjective approach to the expectations of product performance
would not provide a rational basis for determining design defect on a case-bycase basis.72 Manufacturers would find no guidance from cases decided on such
67. FINAL DRAFT, supra note 59, § 2 cmt. d., reporter's note at 84.
68. A fourth alternative, the expectation of the manufacturer, is also possible but unlikely. Such an interpretation would have no judicial or academic roots. The language of the Act does not in any way suggest that such
an approach is meant. Moreover, such an approach would run counter to the well-developed traditions in the
field of products liability law.
69. Miss. CODE ANN. § 11-1-63 (Supp. 1996).
70. Sperry-New Holland v. Prestage, 617 So. 2d 248 (Miss. 1993).
71. Toney v. Kawasaki Heavy Indus., Ltd., 975 E2d 162, 169 (5th Cir. 1992) (recognizing that Mississippi
uses an objective standard "from the perspective of the 'ordinary consumer who purchased it, with the ordinary
knowledge common to the community as to its characteristics,"' and rejecting arguments that the court should
use a subjective standard).
72. Cf Richard N. Pearson, Thoughts for a Restatement of the Law of Products Liability, 4 PROD. LIAB. J.
61, 70-71 (1993).
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a basis because the expectations as to product performance likely would be different in each case. Verdicts are likely to be inconsistent.7 3 Cases could theoretically be decided on the basis of irrational and unrealistic expectations of product
performance. For example, an automobile driver may have an unreasonable
expectation that his car is perfectly safe and impervious to harms in collisions, an
expectation that is unreasonable. However, if a jury were to accept the plaintiff's
claim that such was his actual expectation, the plaintiff will have met the first
element of his claim.7 4 However, the law does not typically protect the irrational
and unreasonable expectations of parties. There is no reason to believe that the
Act intends to give protection to such expectations in this situation. On the other
hand, an unrealistically low expectation of safety should not be used as a bar
against recovery. An automobile user who irrationally believes that an automobile can provide no safety at all should not be barred from recovery for an injury
that a proper design could have prevented.
The lack of logical consistency in a subjective approach may be further illustrated. For example, a sophisticated user with greater knowledge than is common to the ordinary user may have greater expectations of safety than the ordinary user because he is familiar with available design technology. In this case,
the sophisticated user may recover while the less informed user would not
because the latter's expectations would not be as high. Conversely, a more
sophisticated user with greater knowledge of design limitations may have a lower
expectation of safety than an ordinary consumer, with the result that the sophisticated user may not recover for an injury, but the less sophisticated consumer
75

may.

All in all, little commends the subjective approach to design defect. The
approach would lead to confusion and inconsistent verdicts, reward the irrational
and unrealistic expectations of some, and deny recovery in cases where it should
be granted. Since the Act's language does not compel the use of a subjective
approach, the courts should avoid such an interpretation.
b. The Expectations of the Ordinary Consumer
The test of whether a product failed to function as expected is more likely to be
analyzed in light of the expectations of the ordinary consumer with ordinary
knowledge of the community. The Act's language is reminiscent of language
used by the court in State Stove to define the concept of defective condition:
76
"the article has something wrong with it; ... it did not function as expected."
In State Stove, the court adopted Section 402A and its approach to determining
when a product is unreasonably dangerous.7 7 Under this approach, the ultimate
73. Birnbaum, supra note 66, at 613.
74. The Act also requires the plaintiff to prove that a feasible alternative design existed as well. MIss. CODE
ANN. § 1l-l-63(f)(ii) (Supp. 1996). In most cases, a feasible alternative design would not be available where
such an irrational expectation exists.
75. Assumption of the risk might provide a defense to the sophisticated user in any event, but the defendant
must show all of the elements, including a full appreciation of the risk and the voluntariness of encountering the
risk. MISS. CODE ANN. § 11-1-63(d) (Supp. 1996).
76. State Stove Mfg. Co. v. Hodges, 189 So. 2d 113, 121 (Miss. 1966).
77. Id.; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A (1965).
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consumer's contemplation is the focus of the inquiry into the degree of danger
presented by a product.78 However, the consumer in view is the ordinary consumer, not the actual consumer. Comment i to Section 402A, quoted with
approval by the court in Ford Motor Co. v. Matthews,7 9 states that a product is
"unreasonably dangerous if it is dangerous to an extent beyond that which was
contemplated by the ordinary consumer who purchases it, with ordinary knowledge common to the community as to its characteristics."8 The objective nature
of the test was reinforced in Coca Cola Bottling Co. v. Reeves8 in which the
court approved as "essentially correct" a jury instruction by the trial court defining "defective product" as one "'that does not meet the reasonable expectations
of an ordinary consumer as to the safety of the product."' 8 2
Since the language used in the statute has antecedents in the Mississippi cases,
the courts most likely will interpret the Act consistently with the nearly identical
83
language used by the supreme court in applying the consumer expectations test.
Moreover, this approach has a parallel in the language of the Act regarding products that have inherent generic characteristics that "cannot be eliminated without
substantially compromising the product's usefulness or desirability."84 Such
products are not defectively designed when "the ordinary person with the ordinary knowledge common to the community" recognizes such inherent characteristics. 85
The use of a consumer expectations test, even if based on the knowledge common to ordinary users of the product, has its own problems. The consumer
expectations test has been repeatedly and widely criticized since its introduction
in the comments to Section 402A.88 Dean Wade criticized the test's standing
independently of other factors because "the consumer would not know what to
expect, because he would have no idea of how safe the product could be made."87
Sheila Birnbaum likewise has pointed out that consumers are often ill-equipped
to formulate reasoned expectations about safety. 8 In the absence of the plaintiff's proof of what the ordinary consumer expected as to product safety, the
manufacturer is entitled to escape liability.89 Professor Gary Schwartz has writ78. State Stove, 189 So. 2d at 121. See also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A, cmt. g (1965).
79. 291 So. 2d 169 (Miss. 1974).
80. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A (1965). This test has been generally, if not universally, referred to as the consumer expectations test.
81. 486 So. 2d 374 (Miss. 1986). See also Toney v. Kawasaki Heavy Indus., Ltd., 975 F.2d 162, 169 (5th
Cir. 1992) ("[T]he subjective knowledge or belief of the individual plaintiff about the product involved has little
relevance'").
82. Reeves, 486 So. 2d at 384-85. Likewise the court in Sperry-New Holland v. Prestage, 617 So. 2d 248,
254 (Miss. 1993), recognized comment i as the source of Mississippi's consumer expectations test as applied
before adoption of the risk-utility analysis of defect and that the expectation was that of an ordinary consumer.
83. Cf Ottio REv. CODE ANN. § 2307.75(A)(2) (Banks-Baldwin 1993); TENN. CODE ANN. § 29-28-102(8)
(1980).
84. Miss. CODE ANN. § 11-1-63(b) (Supp. 1996).
85. Id.
86. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A (1965).
87. Wade, supra note 41, at 829.
88. Birnbaum, supra note 66, at 604-05.
89. Pearson, supra note 72, at71 (citing Heaton v. Ford Motor Co., 435 R2d 806 (Or. 1967), in which the
court dismissed the plaintiff's claim because he presented no proof of ordinary consumer expectation about the
strength of a pick-up involved in a particular type of collision).
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ten that identifying the substance of consumer expectations," or even developing
a methodology for identifying their substance, proves to be a frustrating task.
There is a paucity of empirical studies providing any clear answers as to what
ordinary consumers expect of the products they buy."9
A second, and related, major criticism of the consumer expectations test has
focused on its vagueness and lack of guidance for a jury in determining whether
a product's design is unreasonably dangerous. Birnbaum has noted that a literal
application of comment i to Section 402A invites the trier of fact to "rely on
some vague common sense notion of what the ordinary consumer expects in the
way of safety."91 Likewise, Professors Henderson and Twerski, reporters for the
Restatement (Third) of Torts: Products Liability,9 2 have observed that the consumer expectations test, standing independently, "is so open-ended and unstructured, that it provides almost no guidance to the jury determining whether a
defect existed."9 " Similarly, Philip Corboy has pointed out that the consumer
expectations test "leads to confusion in a large number of cases, such as workplace accidents and injuries to bystanders, where the plaintiff who was injured is
not the consumer who purchased the product."94
Moreover, as Birnbaum points out, manufacturers of products with open and
obvious defects may escape liability altogether, even though the manufacturer
"could have cost-efficiently eliminated the risk."9' The avoidance of all liability
for open and obvious defects, even those that could be readily eliminated, was
the major reason that the Mississippi Supreme Court rejected the consumer
expectations test in Prestage 6 The court recognized that under the consumer
expectations test as applied in Mississippi, "if [a] plaintiff, applying the knowledge of an ordinary consumer, sees a danger and can appreciate that danger, then
he cannot recover for any injury resulting from that appreciated danger."97 The
open and obvious defense under a consumer expectations test is broader than the
assumption of risk defense because the former affects those who were subjectively unaware of the danger and those who did not voluntarily encounter the danger,
such as those persons who have no choice but to use the product.
One may cynically suggest that a manufacturer, under an approach which
denies recovery for open and obvious dangers no matter how easily corrected by
90. Schwartz, supra note 59, at 478. See also Pearson, supra note 72, at 70. (arguing that "[i]t is not reasonably practical to determine what consumers actually expect of a product.").
91. Birnbaum, supra note 66, at 615.
92. FINAL DRAFr, supra note 59.
93. James A. Henderson, Jr. & Aaron D. Twerski, A Proposed Revision of Section 402A of the Restatement
(Second) of Torts, 77 CORNELL L. REv. 1512, 1534 (1992).
94. Philip H. Corboy, The Not-So-Quiet Revolution: Rebuilding Barriers to Jury Trial in the Proposed
Restatement (Third) of Torts: ProductsLiability, 61 TENN. L. REV. 1043, 1088 (1994).
95. Birnbaum, supra note 66, at 613. See also David G. Owen, The Graying of Products Liability Law:
Paths Taken and Untaken in the New Restatement, 61 TENN. L. REv. 1241, 1247 (1994) (pointing out that manufacturers have often used the consumer expectations test as a sword to defeat claims where there are open and
obvious dangers or the consumer expectations are underdeveloped or "cynically realistic"); Corboy, supra note
94, at 1088 (observing that many trial practitioners find it difficult to show that ordinary consumers entertained
any specific expectations about product safety or performance).
96. Sperry-New Holland v. Prestage, 617 So. 2d 248, 256 (Miss. 1993).
97. Id.
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the manufacturer, has an incentive to make products less safe as long as the lack
of safety is obvious or perhaps warned about. 98 For example, manufacturers
would have no economic incentive, except potential marketing advantages, for
making safer industrial equipment with adequate guards. If the lack of guards
were obvious, injured workers would have only worker's compensation claims,
even though the danger could be readily and reasonably avoided by the manufacturer.99
Critics have not directed all of their fire at the consumer expectations test
because of its use against plaintiffs. Defendants also are at risk because the jury
has little guidance other than their subjective sense as to what an ordinary consumer might expect.100 Moreover, as Professors Henderson and Twerski have
pointed out, manufacturers find no guidance in the test in making design decisions." 1 Manufacturers charged with making products as safe as ordinary consumers expect also lack reliable data on the actual expectations of consumers. 0 2
Taking such expectations into consideration in designing products is all but
10 3
impossible for complex products, especially ones that are new to the market.
Moreover, a determination that a product is defective based on a vague standard
like the consumer expectations test can have significant repercussions on an
entire product line.10 "
The language of the Act requiring the plaintiff to prove that the product "failed
to function as expected" also creates the possibility that a manufacturer will
argue that if it adequately warned of the danger created by the design, it had no
duty to adopt a safer, feasible alternative design. 05 According to this argument,
because the user was made aware of the danger, the product did not fail to function as expected.
Prior to the adoption of the risk-utility test, the Mississippi Supreme Court did
not deal with such a defense under the law. However, some support exists for the
view that Mississippi law prior to the adoption of a risk-utility analysis would not
98. One can imagine automobile manufacturers removing many safety devices from cars (absent government regulatory requirements) and advertising such cars at a reduced price with appropriate warnings. The
argument has been made that if consumers are informed of dangers, they should, as a principal of personal freedom, be allowed to choose to use such products. Cf Cooper v. General Motors Corp., No. 92-CA-01334-SCT,
1996 WL 272362 at * 18 (Miss. May 23, 1996) ("[I]f [plaintiffs] wanted a car with an air bag, they should have
purchased a car with an air bag."). Cars are perhaps not the best example since automobile safety involves
more than just the purchasers, such as passengers who may be unaware of the lack of safety or children who are
unable to protect themselves otherwise. Industrial equipment also would be vulnerable to decrease in safety.
Manufacturers would have little incentive to make safety guards a priority in design when their absence is obvious because only the employer is liable in worker's compensation claims.
99. A majority of courts have rejected the open and obvious or patent danger defense in design defect cases.
James A. Henderson, Jr. & Aaron D. Twerski, Doctrinal Collapse in Products Liability: The Empty Shell of
Failure to Warn, 65 N.Y.U.L. RE. 265, 281 (1990).
100. Cf Birnbaum, supra note 66, at 614; Henderson & Twerski, supra note 93, at 1534. See also Melton v.
Deere & Co., 887 F2d 1241, 1247 (5th Cir. 1989) (Reavely, J., dissenting) (criticizing a consumer expectations
test that allows a decision based on uninformed consumers' subjective expectations).
101. Henderson & Twerski, supra note 93, at 1534.
102. Cf Schwartz, supra note 59, at 478.
103. Cf Birnbaum, supra note 66, at 604.
104. William A. Worthington, The "Citadel" Revisited: Strict Tort Liability and the Policy of Law, 36 S.TEX.
L. REv. 227, 251 (1995).
105. Cf Schwartz, supra note 59, at 476.
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permit a defense that warnings would be a sufficient method of avoiding liability
in a defective design claim where a feasible alternative design existed. In
Jackson v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp.,"0 8 the Fifth Circuit, applying Mississippi
law, stated, "[w]ith respect to products that are unavoidably unsafe, the manufacturer is under a duty to provide adequate warning of those dangers that are reasonably foreseeable."1"7 From this statement, one can infer that a product for
which an alternative design exists is not "avoidably unsafe," thus a warning alone
would not be a sufficient response by the manufacturer to avoid liability. If, as
seems likely, such a view were the law under Mississippi's former consumer
expectations approach, the court would probably follow that approach even under
the new Act.
Under a pure risk-utility analysis, a warning would be insufficient to defeat a
claim of defective design if the risk is greater than the utility of the product, even
considering the warning.108 However, under the Act, the result is not clear. The
language lends itself to the argument that adequate warnings can avoid liability
for design defects, even if such defects are not otherwise obvious. Such a result
would be an unfortunate and unconscionable distortion of the duty to design reasonably safe products." 9
Admittedly, the Act does not rely entirely on the consumer expectations test to
determine defectiveness in design; however, because the test stands independently of other elements of design defect, the criticisms of the test remain applicable
to the requirement that the plaintiff prove the product failed to function as expected. The flaws in a consumer expectations test remain: lack of consumer
knowledge of how safe a product can be made, unrealistically low or high expectations, the vagueness of the standard, and the lack of incentive to manufacturers
to correct obviously dangerous designs.
Mississippi's requirement that the plaintiff prove both that the product failed to
function as expected and a feasible alternative design (a type of risk-utility
test)"' appears to be unique. The combination of two different and required tests
goes beyond the requirements in any other American jurisdiction. Recent tort reform products liability statutes in other states have adopted a risk-utility analysis... or allow the plaintiff to prove a defective design under either a consumer
expectations test or a risk-utility test.' 12 No cases in other jurisdictions seem to
106. 727 E2d 506, 516 (5th Cir. 1984), on reh 'g., 750 E2d 1314 (5th Cir. 1985)(applying Mississippi law).
107. Id. However, the court cited no Mississippi authority for such a proposition, instead citing Borel v.
FibreboardPaperProds. Corp., 493 F2d 1076, 1088 (5th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 869 (1974) (applying a risk-utility analysis under Texas law). Id.
108. See Thibault v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 395 A.2d 843, 847 (N.H. 1978) (citing John E. Montgomery &
David G. Owen, Reflections on the Theory and Administration of Strict Tort Liability of Defective Products,27
S.C. L. REv. 803, 837 (1976) and Aaron D. Twerski, Old Wine in a New Flask-RestructuringAssumption of
Risk in the Products Liability Era, 60 IowA L. REv. 1, 14 (1974)); See also Robinson v. G.G.C., Inc., 808 P.2d
522 (Nev. 1991).
109. Cf Birnbaum, supra note 66, 613-14 (pointing out that leading commentators and most courts have
rejected the patent danger rule as "undermining the duty of manufacturers to design safe products and unconscionably denying recovery to injured plaintiffs").
110. See infra text accompanying notes 175-86.
111. E.g., LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 9:2800.56 (West 1991); ILL. CoMp. STAT. § 5/2-2104 ch. 735 (West Supp.
1996); TEX. CODE ANN. § 82.005 (Supp. 1997).
112. Olo REv. CODE ANN. § 2307.75 (Banks-Baldwin 1993).
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require that both tests be satisfied in order for a plaintiff to prove a defect.
Moreover, the drafters of the Model Uniform Product Liability Act rejected the
consumer expectations test altogether as an appropriate basis for deciding design
defect cases.' 13 The Final Draft also rejects the consumer expectations test as an
independent or stand alone test of design defectiveness. 14 Rather, the comments
to the Final Draft approach consumer expectations as simply one factor among
many in a risk-utility evaluation of design. 15
The primary effect of an objective consumer expectations test, if that is what
the Act mandates, is to make the plaintiff's case more difficult. Not only must a
plaintiff prove that the defendant, for all practical purposes, was negligent in failing to adopt an alternative, safer design, but the plaintiff must prove that the
design used by the manufacturer was not obviously dangerous or that the ordinary consumer had a particular expectation as to the product's safety that the
product failed to meet. If the ordinary consumer does not have an expectation as
to a product's performance or has an unreasonably low expectation, the plaintiff
will be barred from recovery regardless of the feasibility of an alternative design.
The traditional function of products liability law of encouraging, whether
through negligence or strict liability theory, the manufacture of safer products
has largely been sacrificed in the rush to raise barriers to plaintiffs. Caveat emptor has returned to Mississippi with a vengeance.
c. Expectations of the Fully-Informed Consumer
An alternative interpretation of the phrase "failed to function as expected"
could focus on the expectations that a reasonable, fully-informed consumer has a
right to expect, rather than some vaguely empirical notion of what ordinary consumers may be expected actually to know. Some courts have applied the consumer expectations test in this manner. In Seattle-First National Bank v.
Tabert,"6 the Supreme Court of Washington held that "in determining the reasonable expectations of the ordinary consumer, a number of factors must be considered. The relative cost of the product, the gravity of the potential harm from
the claimed defect and the cost and feasibility of eliminating or minimizing the
risk may be relevant in a particular case." '

113. MODEL UNIFORM PRODUCT LIABILITY ACT § 104 (B), Analysis, 44 Fed. Reg. 62714, 62724 (Dep't.
Commerce 1979) [hereinafter MODEL ACT].
114. FINAL DRAFT, supra note 59, § 2 cmt. g.
115. FINAL DRAFT,supra note 59, § 2 cmt. g.
116. 542 P.2d 774 (Wash. 1975).
117. Id. at 779.

1997]

TORT REFORM IN MISSISSIPPI

Under the Tabert approach, the consumer expectations test is functionally the
same as a risk-utilty analysis.118 Commentators advocating the continued use of
consumer expectations support the test in this form. Professor Jerry Phillips
argues that a buyer "can expect a .. . product to be made more safely once her

expectations have been informed... by expert testimony.""' 9 The obviousness of
the danger would not serve as a complete bar because an adequately informed
user or buyer could expect the product to be made more safely.12 Professor John
Culhane similarly argues that the focus of the consumer expectations test ought
to be on what level of safety "a reasonable consumer has the right to expect." '
Obviously, the level of safety that a reasonable consumer has a right to expect
is a reasonable one upon a balancing of the risks posed by the product as
designed against its utility and the availability of feasible alternative designs.
The consumer expectations test based on a fully informed consumer then
becomes indistinguishable from a risk-utility analysis. Should the court adopt
this interpretation, the open and obvious danger bar to recovery could be avoided. The obviousness of the danger would be one factor that would be considered
in determining whether a reasonable consumer would expect the product to function more safely. 22 In essence, the Prestage adoption of risk-utility would survive the adoption of the Act because the two tests would not differ.
The weakness in this argument is found in the pronouncement of the court in
Prestage that the consumer expectations test bars recovery when the danger is
open and obvious to the ordinary consumer."' There is no precedent in
Mississippi cases to support an interpretation of the language of the Act to allow
the Tabert type of approach to consumer expectations." 4 Indeed, while Judge
Reavely in his dissent in Melton v. Deere & Co. 12 5 suggested that the Mississippi
cases supported a reading which would allow the evidence of defective design to
include more than the subjective, uninformed consumer's expectations, the court
in Prestagedid not follow this reading. Instead, the court rejected the consumer
expectations test standing alone as being incompatible with public policy in
products liability design cases.'2 6

118. Racer v. Utterman, 629 S.W2d 387, 394 (Mo. Ct. App. 1981), (observing that a test of negligence when
using hindsight and a consumer expectations test of the type used in Tabert "may in fact be the same-simply
different directions from which fo arrive at the same result"); Birnbaum, supra note 66, at 615 (observing that
such an approach "adds essentially nothing of substance to a straightforward risk-utility balancing approach").
Cf Melton v. Deere & Co., 887 E2d 1241, 1247 (1989) (Reavely, J., dissenting) (arguing in opposition to the
application of open and obvious danger as a complete bar that the Mississippi cases supported the view that
evidence should not be limited to the expectations of "uninformed consumers' subjective expectations" and that
the court should focus "on whether a reasonable person informed of the product's design characteristics and
perfomance would consider it unreasonably dangerous").
119. Phillips, supra note 59, at 1273.
120. Phillips, supra note 59, at 1273
121. John G. Culhane, The Limits of Product Liability Reform Within a Consumer Expectation Model: A
Comparison ofApproaches Taken by the United States and the European Union, 19 HASTINGS INT'L & CoMP. L.

REv. 1, 65 (1995).
122. See Wade, supra note 41, at 837.
123. Sperry-New Holland v. Prestage, 617 So. 2d 248, 256 (Miss. 1993).
124. MIss. CODE ANN. § I I-1-63(f)(ii) (Supp. 1996).
125. 887 F.2d 1241, 1247 (5th Cir. 1989) (Reavely, J., dissenting).
126. Prestage,617 So. 2d at 256
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If the language of the Act is to be understood in terms of the usage in the cases
which preceded the Act, the most likely interpretation of the phrase "failed to
function as expected" remains rooted in the expectations of the ordinary consumer with knowledge common in the community. Interpreting expectations in
light of what a consumer should have a right to expect does not have any support
in the traditional understanding of the consumer expectations test in Mississippi.
Moreover, if a risk-utility approach were to be understood as being incorporated
in this test, it would add little to the other requirements of foreseeabilty of the
danger and feasibility of alternative design. The latter requirement mandates a
balancing of risk and utility which would not be different, in essence, from a
risk-utilty approach to consumer expectation. The "failed to function as expected" language would be superfluous.
3. Alternative Design
a. The Law Prior to the Act
Prior to the effective date of the Act, the law of Mississippi did not appear
explicitly to require that the plaintiff show an alternative design to make out a
prima facie case in a Section 402A design defect claim.127 No Mississippi
Supreme Court opinion has declared that proof of feasible alternative design is a
required element of the plaintiff's proof under either the consumer expectations
test or the risk-utility test. While most plaintiffs in design cases based on theories of negligence and strict liability seek to introduce evidence of alternative
design,128 the Missississippi Supreme Court has never explicitly required that
they do so.' 29
Under the consumer expectations test as applied in Mississippi, a product was
deemed to be unreasonably dangerous and defective if it failed to supply the level
of safety expected by the ordinary consumer.13 Under this test, the focus of the
inquiry as to defective design in a strict liability claim under Section 402A is on
the expectation of the ordinary consumer, not on the feasibility of an alternative
design. 131 As asserted by Professor Marshall Shapo, nothing in the language of
Section 402A appears to require an alternative design.132
In Toliver v. General Motors Corp.,133 the supreme court recognized that the
plaintiff, under a consumer expectations approach in a design claim, may offer

127. Prestage,617 So. 2d at 256.
128. Philip H. Corboy, a plaintiff's attorney, has observed that "[a]s a practical matter... the plaintiff's attorney who does not demonstrate that a safer product was available to defendant overlooks what may be the most
persuasive and compelling aspect of plaintiff's claim in the eyes of the jury." Corboy, supra note 94, at 1092.
129. Cf Kallio v. Ford Motor Co., 407 N.W2d 92, 96-97 (Minn. 1987) ("Although normally evidence of a
safer alternative design will be presented initially by the plaintiff, it is not necessarily required in all cases.").
130. Toliver v. General Motors Corp., 482 So. 2d 213, 218 (Miss. 1985).
131. Id. at 218. See also Cooper v. GeneralMotors Corp., No. 92-CA-01334-SCT, 1996 WL 272362 at *17
(Miss. May 23, 1996), in which the court observed that a consumer has no right to expect added safety by an
appliance which is known by the consumer not to be present in the defendant's product.
132. Marshall S. Shapo, In Search of the Law of Products Liability: The ALl Restatement Project,48 VAND.
L. REv. 631, 669 (1995).
133. 482 So. 2d 213 (Miss. 1985).
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evidence of an alternative design in order to show its feasibility.134 The plaintiff
may offer such evidence in the same way that she may, but without being
required to do so, introduce evidence of a defendant manufacturer's deviation
from industry standards.13 Nevertheless, no Mississippi case applying either a
consumer expectations test or a risk-utility analysis has required proof of feasible alternative design as a prerequisite to a prima facie case of defective
design.

136

The court's discussion of permitting proof of alternative design does not
amount to a requirement that the plaintiff must introduce such proof.1 37 Under
the consumer expectations test, proof of a feasible alternative design may be relevant as evidence of an ordinary consumer's expectation of a product's safety. The
absence of an alternative design, particularly if such an absence was known to
the ordinary consumer, would be relevant to prove the consumer's expectations
as to the level of safety of a product. On the other hand, if the ordinary consumer
were aware of product designs which were feasible, the expectation of safety
might be disappointed by the absence of such designs in the defendant's product.
This disappointment would be especially evident where the absence of such
design characteristics was not disclosed or readily observable by the ordinary
consumer. Nevertheless, the absence of a feasible alternative design does not
automatically defeat consumer expectation of a particular level of safety.
Similarly, the fact that the Mississippi Supreme Court recognized that a product need not be the safest possible in order to be reasonably safe,138 does not necessarily lead to the view that under the pre- 1994 law a plaintiff must produce evidence of a feasible alternative design. 3l 9 The ordinary consumer does not necessarily expect that a product must be the safest product possible, but she does have
some level of safety expectation of the product she purchases. For example, consumers often have reduced safety expectations when purchasing products known
to be of a lesser quality or more cheaply made than other similar products or
models. Thus, a purchaser of an inexpensive subcompact car likely would not
have the same expectations as one who purchases a more expensive, heavier car
replete with the latest safety advances. The purchaser of a subcompact car

134. Id. at 218.
135. Id.
136. The Fifth Circuit seems to have interpreted Mississippi law prior to the Act as requiring proof of an
alternative design in Lloyd v. John Deere Co., 922 F.2d 1192 (5th Cir. 1991). In Lloyd, the plaintiff alleged that
a tractor made some twenty years before rollover bars were feasible was defective because of the absence of
rollover bars. Id. at 1193. The court held that the danger of rollover was open and obvious. Id. at 1195. This
finding alone would have been sufficient to bar plaintiff's claim under a consumer expectations test since the
product was not more dangerous than expected by the ordinary consumer. Nevetheless, the court also found
that the plaintiffs "failed to adduce sufficient evidence, including of a feasible alternative design, to withstand a
directed verdict on the design claim." Id. at 1196. The court cited no Mississippi Supreme Court authority for
this latter ruling, and there appears to be no such authority. On the other hand, the Mississippi Supreme Court
has not held that a defendant was liable, regardless of the lack of proof of an alternative design.
137. Professor Harges has suggested that the Act not change the law in requiring proof of an alternative
design based the language of Toliver permitting introduction of evidence of an alternative design. Harges,
supra note 47, at 716. However, permitting the introduction of such evidence is not the equivalent of requiring
such evidence.
138. Hall v. Mississippi Chem. Express, 528 So. 2d 796, 799-800 (Miss. 1988).
139. But see Harges, supra note 47, at 716.
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expects her car to be reasonably safe but not as safe as the more expensive, better-equipped model.
0
14
The adoption of a risk-utility test for defective design by the supreme court

did not necessarily result in a requirement of proof of a feasible alternative
design as a part of the plaintiff's case. Under the risk-utility approach, feasibility
of alternative design is a significant factor and often may be a determining factor; however, it is not a sine qua non of such an analysis.141 In his famous article
advocating a risk-utility analysis for defective design, Dean Wade listed seven
significant factors to be evaluated.1 42 Among these factors are the availability of
a substitute product and "the manufacturer's ability to eliminate the unsafe character of the product without impairing its usefulness or making it too expensive
to maintain its utility. 1 43 Dean Wade did not suggest that any single factor is
necessary to the plaintiff's prima facie case. Indeed, he suggested that the jury
normally not be told of the specific factors but instead to be given a more generalized instruction about "what a reasonable prudent man would do under the
'
same or similar circumstances."144
For example, under a risk-utility approach one might argue that a particular
product is so dangerous that, despite the fact that no alternative design exists, a
reasonable person would not have placed the product in the stream of
commerce. 4 Moreover, if another product performs the same function for nearly the same cost as efficiently and more safely than the defendant's product, the
defendant's product may be deemed unreasonably dangerous even if no alternative design is available. A jury might conclude, if the evidence were to show
such, that a three-wheeled all-terrain recreational vehicle's function could be performed as efficiently and cost effectively as a more stable and safer four-wheeled
version. The jury, therefore, could conclude that the three-wheeled version was

140. Sperry-New Holland v. Prestage, 617 So. 2d 248 (Miss. 1993).
141. See Corboy, supra note 94, at 1092-95.
142. Wade, supra note 41, at 837. The factors are:
(1) The usefulness and desirability of the product - its utility to the user and to the public as a
whole. (2) The safety aspects of the product - the likelihood that it will cause injury, and the probable seriousness of the injury. (3) The availability of a substitute product which would meet the same
need and not be as unsafe. (4) The manufacturer's ability to eliminate the unsafe character of the
product without impairing its usefulness or making it too expensive to maintain its utility. (5) The
user's ability to avoid danger by the exercise of care in the use of the product. (6) The user's anticipated awareness of the dangers inherent in the product and their avoidability, because of general
public knowledge of the obvious condition of the product, or of the existence of suitable warnings or
instructions. (7) The feasibility, on the part of the manufacturer, of spreading the loss by setting the
price of the product or carrying liability insurance.
Id. In Sperry-New Holland v. Prestage, 617 So. 2d 248, 256 n.3 (Miss. 1993), the supreme court cited with
approval Dean Wade's seven factors for use in a risk-utility analysis.
143. Wade, supra note 41, at 837.
144. Wade, supra note 41, at 840.
145. Such an argument has been made against cigarettes. See, e.g., Ellen Wertheimer, The Smoke Gets in
Their Eyes: Product CategoryLiability and Alternative FeasibleDesigns in the Third Restatement, 61 TENN. L.
REv. 1429, 1446-49 (1994). Cf Horton v. American Tobacco Co., 667 So. 2d 1289 (Miss. 1995), discussed
infra (plurality affirming a finding that cigarettes are unreasonably dangerous, but without discussion of alternative designs). See also Corboy, supra note 94, at 1096 (discussing a children's toy which consisted "of a blob
of mercury [a toxic chemical] encased in a plastic maze" for which no substitute was available to replace the
mercury's function).

1997]

TORT REFORM IN MISSISSIPPI

unreasonably dangerous and that the defendant is liable.146 As this example illustrates, alternative design is not necessarily a component of the plaintiff's required
proof under a risk-utility test.
In most cases, the absence of alternative design will result in a defendant's verdict on the ground that the utility of the product as designed outweighed its risks
because an alternative was not available. 47 However, the Mississippi Supreme
Court never precluded a plaintiff from arguing that a product was defectively
designed even if no alternative design existed. The case of Horton v. American
Tobacco Company148 presented what may have been the best opportunity for the
court to discuss the alternative design requirement under pre- 1994 law.
In Horton, the plaintiffs pursued a wrongful death claim arising from the death
of plaintiffs' decedent from lung cancer allegedly caused by the manufacturer's
defectively designed cigarettes.149 A divided court affirmed the jury finding that
the cigarettes were defectively designed but that plaintiffs were not entitled to
any damages. 5 A majority concluded that the trial court erred in its instructions
by giving a consumer expectations test of defect rather than a risk-utility test. 51
A plurality concluded that the error in the instruction on defect was harmless and
that the evidence supported a finding of defect under the risk-ultility analysis. 2
The brief of the appellees/cross-appellants raised the argument that plaintiffs
were required to prove an alternative design, 5 ' but the court did not address this
point. The plurality opinion does not mention the issue of alternative design. The
plaintiff offered evidence that the manufacturer "spiked" its product with additives, such as additional nicotine and human carcinogens.5 4 Presumably the plurality found this evidence sufficient to sustain a finding that the product could
have been made more safely, thus avoiding the alternative design problem,
155
although the plaintiff did not explicitly argue this position on appeal.
The minority opinion, authored by then Chief Justice Hawkins, rejected riskutility as an appropriate test to apply to cigarette design cases."5 6 The Chief
Justice conceded that any reasonable person would conclude that the dangers of

146. Cf Antley v. Yamaha Motor Corp., U.S.A., 539 So. 2d 696, 703 (La. Ct. App. 1989). Professors
Henderson and Twerski contend that it is inappropriate to find a product unreasonably dangerous in the absence
of an alternative design because this results in the condemnation of a product category and such a condemnation is outside of the courts' competence. James A. Henderson, Jr. & Aaron D. Twerski, Closing the American
Products Liability Frontier: The Rejection of Liability Without a Defect, 66 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1263, 1301- 31
(1991). See infra text accompanying notes 192-95.
147. Whether a majority of jurisdictions support proof of a reasonable alternative design as a requirement of
the plaintiff's design defect case is hotly disputed. See TENTATIVE DRAFTr, supra note 59, cmt. c, reporter's note
at 48-50 (supporting the view that this is the majority position). Cf, e.g., Frank J. Vandall, The Restatement
(Third) of Torts: Products Liability Section 2(b): The ReasonableAlternative Design Requirement, 61 TENN. L.
RE. 1407, 1408 (1994).
148. 667 So. 2d 1289 (Miss. 1995).
149. Id. at 1289-90.
150. Id.
151. Id.
152. Id.
153. Brief for Appellees/Cross Appellants at 20-2 1, Horton (No. 9 1-CA-0006).
154. Horton v. American Tobacco Co., 667 So. 2d 1289, 1301 (Miss 1995) (Lee, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part).
155. See generallyAmended Brief for Appellants/Cross-Appellees, Horton (No. 91-CA-0006).
156. Horton, 667 So. 2d at 1293.
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cigarettes outweigh any utility or benefit they might have. 15 7 However, he contended that the court should not "extend the 'risk utility' analysis to situations in
which the plaintiff is not required to use a product in order to make a living for
himself or family.' 15 8 Since consumers are not constrained to smoke, the court
should not substitute its judgment for that of the consumer, leaving such decisions to the realm of personal choice.1 5 9 The minority opinion did not reach the
matter of alternative design.
In conclusion, the prior law of Mississippi is not entirely clear as to the existence of an alternative design requirement in a design defect claim. The court
has recognized that the plaintiff may introduce evidence of alternative design in
proving defective design. However, the court passed on the opportunity to
address any requirement of such proof by failing to address the matter in Horton.
b. Feasible Alternative Design Under the Act
The Act requires that the plaintiff prove as a part of her case-in-chief that at the
time the product left the manufacturer's control "there existed a feasible design
160
alternative that would have to a reasonable probability prevented the harm.'
The Act defines feasible alternative design as "a design that would have to a reasonable probability prevented the harm without impairing the utility, usefulness,
practicality or desirability of the product to users or consumers."'' The requirement that the plaintiff prove the existence of a feasible alternative design appears
to represent a change in the law as it has been stated by the Mississippi Supreme
Court in its pre-Act opinions by explicitly requiring proof of a feasible alternative design.' 62 However, for the most part, the practical effects of an alternative
63
design requirement will not be widely noticed.
(i) Existence of Alternative Design
The Act is not as precise as it could be with reference to the meaning of the
existence of an alternative design. The Act merely declares that the plaintiff
must prove the alternative design existed at the time the product left the control
of the manufacturer. The Act does not qualify further what is intended by the
word "existed." Does an alternative design that has been proposed or conceived,

157. Id. at 1294-95.
158. Id. at 1295 n.l.
159. Id. at 1296. Under the Act, a court could have allowed a fact-finding of defectively designed cigarettes
in a Horton-type case because of the evidence of additives not required for the product's function, assuming
that plaintiffs could show that the additives caused harm that probably would not have occurred in their absence
and assuming that plaintiff could get by the problem of expectation regarding product safety. The Act does not
make a distinction between work-related products and other products.
160. Miss. CODE ANN. § 1 -1-63(f)(ii) (Supp. 1996).
161. Id.
162. But see Harges, supra note 47, at 715-16 (concluding the alternative design requirement is consistent
with the state of the art defense as applied in Mississippi before the Act). Even if state of the art were an appropriate defense under the pre-Act law, the Act places the burden of proof of alternative design squarely on the
shoulders of the plaintiff.
163. See note 128, supra. Those cases where the change would be material would be in cigarette cases and
other cases involving products where there is no feasible alternative design or where expert testimony might not
otherwise be required to support a plaintiff's case because of the obviousness of the defective design.
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but not yet put into production, qualify as an existing alternative design, or must
the design be one that is in actual production? The same question has been
raised by Professor Thomas Galligan 64 regarding a similar provision in the
Louisiana Products Liability Act." 5 He suggests that if the interpretation were to
be one that requires actual production, an industry will be left to define its own
standard of care.166 An industry would be free to ignore safer alternative designs
that are known to be feasible but not yet in production.
On the other hand, should a court permit the testimony of a witness on behalf
of the plaintiff that the witness developed a prototype of an alternative design
which existed at the time required by the Act but which was not publicized, was
unknown, and was not readily knowable to the defendant manufacturer? From
the manufacturer's point of view, such testimony may result in holding the manufacturer liable for failing to adopt an alternative design even though the information regarding such a design was not readily available. In such a case, the manufacturer would be liable without fault for failing to adopt an essentially unavailable design.167
A very narrow application of the Act's literal language seems to preclude the
introduction of evidence that an industry or particular manufacturer reasonably
could have developed an alternative design with existing technology and scientific knowledge, but did not do so.' 68 Thus, for example, suppose that a manufacturer has produced a new industrial machine, substantially different enough from
other existing machines to be differentiated as a separate product category, but
similar in certain respects. The manufacturer made the new machine without
certain guards to protect workers using the machine. Suppose further that the
plaintiff can produce evidence that, applying technology available at the time of
manufacture, the manufacturer could have included guards on the machine similar to guards on other similar products. Should the injured plaintiff be barred
from offering evidence that guards were technologically and practically feasible
under existing knowledge even if no manufacturer or designer has proposed or
implemented guards for the new industrial machine?' 69 To bar such evidence
permits the manufacturer to market new products while ignoring the application
of existing technology that would result in improved safety.
The best approach in resolving such issues is for the court to seek a reading of
the Act that would allow the plaintiff to prove that an alternative design was in

164. Thomas C. Galligan, Jr., The Louisiana Products LiabilityAct: Making Sense oflt All, 49 LA. L. REv.
629, 661-62 (1989).
165. LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 9:2800.56 (West 1991).
166. Galligan, supra note 164, 661-62.
167. CompareLA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 9:2800.59.A (West 1991) ("reasonably available"); ILL. COMP. STAT. §
5/2-2104 ch. 735 (West Supp. 1996) ("available and developed for commercial use and acceptable in the marketplace"); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 600.2946(2) (West Supp. 1996) ("developed... and capable of use...
and. . . economically feasible"). See also Allen v. Minnstar, Inc., 8 F.3d 1470, 1480 (10th Cir. 1993) ("The
mere existence of prototypes does not obligate manufacturers to implement such devices in their products.").
168. The FINAL DRAFT appears to allow a plaintiff to present evidence that a reasonable alternative design
could have been developed and adopted by the manufacturer, even if such a design had not been adopted by any
manufacturer or considered for commercial use. FINAL DRAFT, supra note 59, § 2(b) cmt. d.
169. Cf Galligan, supra note 164, at 662-63 (discussing the Louisiana Products Liability Act and the view
that the plaintiff need only show an alternative design to be possible or existing at the time of the trial, leaving
the defendant to produce evidence that the product was state of the art as a defense).
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production, that the design concept was in existence (whether in production or
merely proposed) and reasonably available to the manufacturer, or that the design
could have been reasonably developed and adopted under existing technology,
whether actually conceived or not. Such an approach would protect the manufacturer's interest in being held liable only if at fault in design, but would also
protect the consumer from manufacturer's fault in failing to act reasonably to
develop improvements to safety within existing technological and practical
bounds. In other words, an industry could not reasonably refuse to develop
improvements and safeguards without being subject to liability when the practical technology existed to do so.
In any event, the new law is clear that the plaintiff must prove that an alternative design existed at the time the product left the manufacturer's control. If no
alternative design exists, a product with a high degree of danger with little or no
use or benefit to society is not defectively designed under Mississippi law, even
if the manufacturer foresees the danger and the ordinary consumer does not. The
only possible claim in such a case would be for failure to warn.17 Absent proof
of an alternative design, a plaintiff cannot contend under the Act that a product
was so dangerous that it should not have been placed in the stream of
17
commerce. 1
(ii) Feasibility
The feasibility requirement of the alternative design has two elements: (1) The
alternative design must not impair "the utility, usefulness, practicality or desirability of the product to users or consumers, '172 and (2) the plaintiff must show
the alternative design probably would have prevented the harm.173 Each of these
elements will be discussed in turn. A related matter is whether the alternative
design proposed is actually a separate product category.
(a) Utility, Practicality, and Desirability
The plaintiff must prove in her prima facie case not only the existence of the
alternative design but also that the proposed alternative design does not impair
the utility, usefulness, practicality or desirability of the product to users or con-

170. See Miss. CODE ANN. § 11-1-63(c) (Supp. 1996).
171. Compare FINAL DRAFT, supra note 59, § 2 cmt. d: "The requirement... that plaintiff show a reasonable
alternative design applies even though plaintiff alleges that the category of product sold by the defendant is so
dangerous that it should not have been marketed at all." Cf Hopkins v. NCR Corp., Civ. A. No. 93-188-B-M2,
1994 WL 757510 (M.D. La. 1994 Nov. 17, 1994) (plaintiff was not entitled to recovery on the grounds that she
failed to prove existence of an alternative design to a data input device requiring repetitive motion).
Nevertheless, the FINAL DRAFT recognizes that "[several courts have suggested that the designs of some products are so manifestly unreasonable, in that they have low social utility and high degree of danger, that liability
should attach even absent proof of a reasonable alternative design." FINAL DRAFT, supra note 59, § 2 cmt. d.
The literal language of section 2(b) does not support this view; however, the reporters take the position that
comment d to section 2 does reflect the view that in rare cases an alternative design need not be presented.
FINAL DRAFT, supra note 59, § 2 cmt. d, reporter's note, at 68-74, and cmt. e, reporter's note, at 100. Cf OHIO
RE. CODE ANN. § 2307.75(F) (1993) (dispensing with the alternative design requirement when "[t]he manufacturer acted unreasonably in introducing the product into trade or commerce").
172. Miss. CODE ANN. § 11-1-63(f)(ii) (Supp. 1996).
173. Id.
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sumers.174 Such a requirement is the heart of what may be called the risk-utility
analysis in design cases as it now exists in Mississippi.175 The focus of the riskutility test in design cases is on the consumer's or user's perspective, not the manufacturer's. Thus, a plaintiff theoretically need not be concerned with the difficulty or inconvenience to the manufacturer of adopting the alternative design,
except indirectly to the extent that such matters affect the consumer, such as the
price charged to the consumer.

17 6

The fact finder must determine whether the evidence shows that the alternative
design is, in effect, safer and that the increased safety would not cause a decrease
in the efficiency or effectiveness of product performance or in the aesthetic
appearance (where important); cause an increase in the cost to acquire, maintain,
or operate; or have other similar negative effects such that a user or consumer
would prefer the alternative design over the design as manufactured by the defendant. In other words, assuming the alternatively designed product would have
probably prevented the accident and was thus safer, would the consumer or user
prefer the alternative to the product as actually manufactured? If not, the alternative design is not a feasible design under the Act and the defendant would prevail. If the answer is yes, the plaintiff would succeed as to this element in the
burden of proof.
The Act does not expressly qualify the requirement that the alternative design
proposed by the plaintiff must not impair the utility, practicality, or desirability of
the product. 77 The Act does not state the degree of permissible impairment.
One could interpret the provision literally to mean that any impairment, however
slight, would bar a finding of feasible alternative design.
In contrast, the Act provides, as to a claim involving a product with "an inherent characteristic which is a generic characteristic aspect of the product," that the
manufacturer is not liable if that characteristic "cannot be eliminated without
substantially compromising the product's usefulness or desirability .. . 17
Thus, if the generic characteristic can be eliminated without a significant
decrease in utility or desirability of the product, the manufacturer may be liable
for failing to do so.

174. Id.
175. The Mississippi approach is similar to the approach taken in the FINAL DRAFT, supra note 59, § 2 cmt.
d.: "[Tihe test is whether a reasonable alternative design would, at reasonable cost, have reduced the foreseeable risks of harm posed by the product and, if so, whether the omission of the alternative design rendered the
product not reasonably safe." The Mississippi test is more specific, and perhaps more limiting, compared to the
Final Draft in that in Mississippi the design must be evaluated from the consumer's or user's perspective. The
alternative design requirement of the Final Draft has been much criticized as going too far in restricting plaintiff's ability to show that a product is unreasonably dangerous. See, e.g., Shapo, supra note 132, at 660-64, 66877 (crticizing an earlier draft version). The alternative design requirement has been defended just as vigorously.
See, e.g., Henderson & Twerski, supra note 146, at 1301-14; Theodore S. Jankowski, Focusing on Quality and
Risk: The CentralRole of Reasonable Alternatives in EvaluatingDesign and Warning Decisions, 36 S. TEX. L.
RE. 283, 339-49 (1995).
176. Compare this approach to the Louisiana Products Liability Act which allows consideration of the "burden on the manufacturer of adopting" plaintiff's alternative design as a factor in the weighing of the alternative
design against the defendant's design. LA. RE. STAT. ANN. § 9:2800.56(2) (West 1991).
177. MISS. CODE ANN. § I l-l-63(f)(ii) (Supp. 1996).
178. MISS. CODE ANN. § 11-1-63(b) (Supp. 1996).
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This author suggests that the two provisions of the Act concerning the degree
of permissible impairment of a product's usefulness or desirability must be
applied consistently in order to give rational application to both sections of the
Act. The feasible alternative design requirement must be understood to mean
that the plaintiff's alternative design proposal cannot significantly impair the
product's usefulness or desirability.179 A slight impairment of function or desirability posed by an alternative design should not bar the claim on the basis of
such an impairment. To interpret this requirement otherwise would result effectively in reading out of the Act the language qualifying the extent of permissible
impairment in the section of the Act dealing with inherent characteristics.18 In
inherent characteristic cases, a manufacturer would simply rely on the feasible
alternative design requirement which literally forbids any impairment at all. 8 '
The legislature could not have intended such an irrational result.
Another potential problem is the identification of the consumer or user of a
product in an industrial or commerical business setting. The consumer or user
could be considered the corporate purchaser of a piece of industrial equipment or
the workers employed to use the equipment by the purchaser. In such an event, is
the product design which caused the harm to be evaluated from the view of the
corporation which owns the equipment or the view of the employee who uses the
equipment? The viewpoint may be significant in evaluating an alternative
design's utility, practicality, or desirability.
The worker is indirectly concerned with the employer's bottom line because of
the effect on the existence of the worker's job and rate of compensation, but the
worker may well value the utility, practicality, or desirability of an item of equipment differently from his employer. The worker may be concerned more with his
individual safety than the effect on the employer's profits. Although costs of
worker's compensation and other matters relating to employee welfare may affect
the employer-owner's view of utility, practicality, or desirabilty of a piece of
industrial equipment, the determining factors are likely to be different from the
employees

~whn ,,

the equipment. Thus, the determination of whose perspec-

tive is to be used in evaluating industrial or commerical equipment may make a
significant difference in the outcome of whether an alternative design is feasible
under the Act. 82
The most likely interpretation of "user or consumer" under the alternative
design requirement is that these terms refer to both the persons who actually use

179. Compare ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/2-2104 ch. 735 (West Supp. 1996) (providing that the proposed alternative
design "would have prevented the harm without significantly impairing the usefulness, desirability, or marketability of the product").
180. MIss. CODE ANN. § 11-1-63 (Supp. 1996).
181. See infra text accompanying notes 196-197 (concluding that section (b) of the Act dealing with inherent
characteristics is not necessary because it is duplicative of the feasible alternative design requirement).
182. Similar issues exist for products designed and marketed for children, the patients of medical professionals, and bystanders. The status of bystanders is considered in PART I, supra note 2, at 425-26, 434-35.
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or consume the product as well as to the owner."a Such an approach would be
consistent with the usage and practice under Section 402A. Comment 1 to
Section 402A states that those who prepare food for consumption as well as
those who actually consume it are included as "consumers.""1 4 "Users" includes
employees who repair a product for the owner. 8 The Act gives no indication
that the legislature intended to change the understanding of these terms in evaluating claims of design defects.
(b) Reasonable Probability
In addition to showing that the alternative design would not impair the utility,
practicality, or desirability of the product, the plaintiff must show that the alternative design "would have to a reasonable probability prevented the harm." 86
Presumably, this means that the alternative design would more probably than not
have prevented or reduced the harm. The focus of any interpretation of this
requirement is on the words "reasonable probability" and "would ... have prevented the harm."
Unfortunately the term "reasonable probability" is ambiguous, having various
meanings in different legal contexts. For example, in the context of ineffective
representation by counsel in criminal cases, the term "reasonable probability"
does not mean "more likely than not," but simply "probability sufficient to
'
In other contexts, such as the burden
undermine confidence in the outcome."187
of proof of causation in a civil case, "reasonable probability" has been interpreted as meaning "more likely than not" or "more probably than not.""l In the context of the Act, the language should be interpreted as meaning "more probably
than not" rather than merely a significant possibility. The legislature likely did
not intend the plaintiff to have a lesser burden of proof than the traditional preponderance of the evidence rule.
The phrase "would ...

have prevented the harm" is similarly not as clear as it

might have been. Literally read, a plaintiff could recover only if she proves that
no harm would have befallen her had she used the alternative design. Such an
interpretation should not be adopted. A preferable reading is one that takes the

183. In cases involving children's products, the viewpoint of parent or other adult supervisor is the relevant
viewpoint. Todd v. Societe BIC, S.A., 21 F.3d 1402, 1407-08 (7th Cir. 1994), (applying Illinois law); Bellotte
v. Zayre Corp., 352 A.2d 723, 725 (N.H. 1976). As to a patient, the viewpoint may be that of the patient. Cf V
Mueller & Co. v. Corley, 570 S.W2d 140, 145 (Tex. Civ. App. 1978). But see Rosburg v. Minnesota Mining &
Mfg. Co., 226 Cal. Rpt. 299, 304 (Cal. App. Ct. 1986).
184. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, § 402A, cmt. 1(1965).
185. Id.
186. Miss. CODE ANN. § 11-1-63(f)(ii) (Supp. 1996).
187. Stickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 693-94 (1984). Cf Wilcher v. State, 455 So. 2d 727, 736 (Miss.
1984), (a "reasonable probability of innocence" requires a verdict of acquittal even though the theory of guilt is
more reasonable than the theory of innocence); Quinn v. Southern Pac. Transp. Co., 711 P.2d 139 (Ariz. 1985)
(distinguishing between "more probable than not" and reasonable probability as test for impermissible discrimination against a handicapped applicant for employment).
188. See, e.g., Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc. v. Havner, 907 S.W2d 535, 543 (Tex. Civ. App. 1995) (involving
proof of causation in a civil tort claim). Cf Monsanto Chem. Co. v. Sykes, 147 So. 2d 290, 295 (Miss. 1962)
(equating "reasonable probability" with "probably" in a case involving proof that oil wells produce in paying
quantities).

MISSISSIPPI COLLEGE LAW REVIEW

[VOL. 17:277

Act to mean that the plaintiff must show that the alternative design would have
reduced or prevented the harm.189 Put somewhat differently, the plaintiff should
be required to show only that the alternative design would have prevented the
harm from occurring to the same exent and degree. 9 The plaintiff should not be
required to prove the existence of an absolutely safe alternative design any more
than the manufacturer should be required to produce an absolutely safe product.
A product should be reasonably safe, or as safe as is practical and feasible.191
Thus, a consumer or user should be entitled to expect a product's design to
reduce the degree or extent of harm to the extent practical and feasible if such
harm cannot be feasibly and practically eliminated. Too narrow a reading of the
word "prevented" would be manifestly unjust and unnecessary.
(c) Alternative Design or Alternative Product
The problem of distinguishing a different product category from an alternative
design of the defendant's product arises in connection with the alternative design
requirement. The difference between alternative design and alternative product
is one of degree. 92 For example, a bicycle is clearly a different product from a
tricycle. A riding lawnmower is a different product from a push model mower,
even though they perform similar functions in cutting grass. However, is a car
equipped with an airbag restraint system a different product from a car equipped
only with seatbelts? 93 Professor Galligan, in addressing a similar problem with
the Louisiana Products Liability Act, suggests that the courts should not apply
the requirement of alternative design too narrowly. 94 The focus should be on the
function and purpose of the designs in question.
Professors Henderson and Twerski have suggested that distinguishing a marginal design variation within a product category from a different product category is a fact question for the fact finder to resolve by focusing on the substitutability of the alternative proposed by the plaintiff for the defendant's product. 9
Nevertheless, the court likely will be required to make a preliminary determination in some cases as to whether the plaintiff's design should be submitted to the
jury as an alternative design or whether it should not be submitted because the
proposed design results in a clearly different product.

189. The same solution has been proposed for a similar problem created by the language of the Louisiana
Products Liability Act, § 2800.56(1). Galligan, supra note 164, at 664-65. The FINAL DRAFTr, supranote 59, §
2(b), labels a product defectively designed if the reasonable alternative design could have "reduced or avoided"
the foreseeable risks of harm and the product as designed is not reasonably safe.
190. See Galligan, supra note 164, at 665.
191. Cf Hall v. Mississippi Chem. Express, 528 So. 2d 796, 800 (Miss. 1988).
192. Galligan, supra note 164, at 664.
193. Galligan, supra note 164, at 664.
194. Galligan, supra note 163, at 664.
195. Henderson & Twerski, supra note 146, at 1263; FINAL DRAFT, supra note 59, § 2 cmt. e (stating that "[in
large part the problem is one of how the range of relevant alternative designs is manifested.").
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(iii) Inherent Characteristics that Are Generic
Related to the issue of alternative design is the provision of the Act that bars
recovery for injuries for defective design or formulation caused by "an inherent
characteristic of the product which is a generic aspect of the product that cannot
be eliminated without substantially compromising the product's usefulness or
desirability" and which is commonly known by ordinary persons.19 6 In light of
the requirement of proof of a feasible alternative design, this "generic aspect"
provision of the Act seems to be superfluous. In a case where no design alternative could prevent or reduce the harm without impairing the product's utility or
desirability, the product is not defectively designed, whether the design characteristic of the product creating the risk of harm is a generic aspect of the product or
not.197 The feasible alternative design requirement would bar any design claim
involving a product with a dangerous characteristic that cannot be avoided or
reduced without impairing the product's utility or desirability, without regard to
the "generic aspect" provision of the statute.
B. Warnings or InstructionsDefect

1. The Duty to Warn at the Time of Sale
In a warnings or instruction defect claim, under the Act, a plaintiff must prove
that (1) the manufacturer failed adequately to warn or instruct regarding a danger
associated with the product of which the manufacturer knew or should have
known in light of reasonably available knowledge at the time the product left the
manufacturer's control;198 (2) the danger was one that an ordinary consumer
would not realize;199 (3) the danger was unreasonable;"' and (4) the danger caused
the plaintiff's harm." 1 The Act provides that an adequate warning is one that
a reasonably prudent person in the same or similar circumstances would have
provided with respect to the danger and that communicates sufficient information on the dangers and safe use of the product, taking into account the charac-

196. MIss. CODE ANN. § 11-1-63(b) (Supp. 1996). The language of the Act is nearly identical to an Illinois
provision dealing with inherent characteristics of products. ILL. COMP. STAT. § 5/2-2106.5 ch. 735 (West 1996).
The Illinois version provides:
In a product liability action, a manufacturer or product seller shall not be liable for harm allegedly
caused by a product if the alleged harm was caused by an inherent characteristic of the product
which is a generic aspect of the product that cannot be eliminated without substantially compromising the product's usefulness or desirability and which is recognized by the ordinary person with the
ordinary knowledge common to the community.
Id. Illinois also has a feasible alternative design requirement. ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/2-2104 CH. 735 (West 1996).
197. Compare FINAL DRAFT, supra note 59, § 2 cmt. d (stating that absent proof of a defect by means of alternative design in design cases, or a defect in warnings or manufacture, "courts have not imposed liability for categories of products that are generally available and widely used and consumed, even if they pose substantial
risks of harm." Instead, courts have left responsibility related to the availability of the products to the legislature
and administrative agencies.) Under the approach of the FINAL DRAFT, there is no need to single out "generic
aspects" of a product for special treatment. The alternative design requirement covers such products.
198. MISS. CODE ANN. § I I-1-63(c)(i) (Supp. 1996).
199. Id.
200. MIss. CODE ANN. § 11-1-63(a)(ii) (Supp. 1996).
201. MIss. CODE ANN. § 1 -1-63(a)(iii) (Supp. 1996).
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knowledge common to an ordinary consumer who
teristics of, and the ordinary
20 2
purchases the product.
However, as to a "prescription drug, medical device or other product that is
intended to be used only under the supervision of a physician or other licensed professional person,' 2 3 adequacy of the warning is to be evaluated by taking into
account "the characteristics of, and the ordinary knowledge common to, a physician
20 4
or other licensed professional who prescribes the drug, device or other product.
The Act continues the negligence based approach in warnings cases that the
courts have followed since adopting Section 402A. Commentators have consistently recognized that strict liability, as applied by the vast majority of courts to
warnings, is indistinguishable from traditional negligence theory. 205 In general,
courts, including Mississippi courts, have not imputed knowledge to the manufacturer of dangers that were not reasonably foreseeable or knowable.20 6
The Mississippi Supreme Court, moreover, has stated that a manufacturer need
not warn of open and obvious defects. 2 7 Even though the court made this pronouncement in a negligence case prior to the adoption of strict liability theory in
products liability cases, federal courts applying Mississippi law have continued
to apply the open and obvious rule in warnings cases after the adoption of
Section 402A.20 8
Nevertheless, some doubt exists as to the efficacy of an open and obvious
defense under the law prior to the Act in light of the court's pronouncement in
Prestage that Mississippi had adopted a risk-utility analysis in 1988.209 The
Mississippi Supreme Court has stated that under the risk-utility test, the open and
obvious defense does not bar recovery under either negligence theory or strict
liability theory in a products liability action. 210 The court has not faced a warnings case since its abolition of the open and obvious defense as a complete bar to
recovery in a products liability case. One could certainly argue that in a risk-utility warnings case, given the rather absolutist language of the court in rejecting

202. MISS. CODE ANN. § I 1-1-63(c)(ii) (Supp. 1996).

203. Id.
204. Id.
205. See, e.g., Mark M. Hager, Don't Say I Didn't Warn You (Even Though I Didn't): Why the Pro-Defendant
Consensus on Warning Law Is Wrong, 61 TENN. L. REv. 1125, 1130 (1994), 1 M. STuART MADDEN, PRODUCTS

LIABILITY § 10.3, at 377 (2d ed. 1988) [hereinafter MADDEN]. Some courts have expressly reached this same
conclusion. E.g., Olson v. Prosoco, Inc., 522 N.W.2d 284, 289 (Iowa 1994) ("[A]ny posited distinction
between strict liability and negligence principles [in warnings cases] is illusory.").
206. See, e.g., Jackson v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 750 F.2d 1314, 1320 (5th Cir. 1985) (applying
Mississippi law); Wyeth Labs., Inc. v. Fortenberry, 530 So. 2d 688, 691 (Miss. 1988) (drug manufacturer has a
duty to warn of"any known adverse effects"). See also, MADDEN, supra note 205, § 10.3, at 377-79.
207. Harrist v. Spencer-Harris Tool Co., 140 So. 2d 558, 562 (Miss. 1962).
208. Thomas v. Hoffman-LaRoche, Inc., 949 F.2d 806, 811 (5th Cit. 1992), cert. denied, 504 U.S. 956 (1992);
Lenoir v. C.O. Porter Mach. Co., 672 F.2d 1240, 1244 (5th Cir. 1982). This approach is in line with the clear
majority rule. See MADDEN, supra note 205, § 10.5, at 387; FINAL DRAFt, supra note 59, § 2 cmt. i, reporter's
note, at 111.
209. Sperry-New Holland v. Prestage, 617 So. 2d 248, 256 (Miss. 1993).
210. Id. at 256; Seymour v. Brunswick Corp., 655 So. 2d 892, 895 (Miss. 1995); Materials Transp. Co. v.
Newman, 656 So. 2d 1199, 1203 (Miss. 1995).
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the defense as a complete bar,211 the open and obvious danger of the product
should not bar recovery in a warnings defect case. Rather, the open and obvious
danger simply should be regarded as one factor in the evaluation of the unreasonably defective condition of the product. However, such an argument has not been
the generally accepted view, even where risk-utility has been adopted as the
appropriate approach to design defect.2 12
Regardless of any doubts that may linger as to the pre-Act law, the current law
is clear that the manufacturer need not warn of a dangerous condition that the
'
However, the manufacturer is liable
ordinary consumer "would ...realize."213
for failure to warn of dangers foreseeable to the manufacturer but not obvious to
in
the ordinary users or consumers.214 This approach places Mississippi squarely
21 5
Draft.
Final
the
by
taken
approach
the
with
and
rule
majority
the
with
accord
The Act's provisions for evaluation of the adequacy of a warning or instruction
appear to be consistent with the law prior to the Act. Under the Act, the adequacy of a disputed warning or instruction is to be evaluated in light of an instruction or warning that "a reasonably prudent person in the same or similar circumstances would have provided" as to the safe use of the product and the danger of
its use, considering "the characteristics of, and the ordinary knowledge common
to an ordinary consumer who purchases the products. 2 16 Under prior law, adequate warning was defined as one that is "reasonable under the circumstances. 21 7
The Act specifically incorporates a learned intermediary rule 21 8 with respect to
warnings and instructions for prescription drugs, medical devices, and other
products intended to be used only under the supervision of a licensed professional. 219 The statutory adoption of the learned intermediary rule is consistent with
prior law,220 although the rule is not limited in Mississippi to licensed profession-

211. See Seymour v. Brunswick Corp, 655 So. 2d 892, 895 (Miss. 1995). The court stated that, "the current
state of our tort law is that the open and obvious defense is simply a factor and not a complete bar in our jurisdiction applying comparative negligence principles." Id.
212. See FINAL DRAFT,supra note 59, § 2 cmtj, reporter's note, at 108.
213. Miss. CODE ANN. § I I-1-63(c)(i) (Supp. 1996).
214. The concept of foreseeability (what the manufacturer knew or should have known in light of reasonably
available knowledge) should include dangers that reasonable pre-marketing testing would indicate. See FINAL
DRAFT, supra notes 59, § 2 cmt. m.
215. FINAL DRAFT,supra note 59 § 2 cmt. i ("[W]amings... should inform users and consumers of nonobvious risks that unavoidably inhere in using or consuming the product.") and cmt. j ("In general, a product seller
is not subject to liability for failure to warn or instruct regarding risks and risk avoidance measures that should
be obvious to, or generally known by, foreseeable product users.").
216. MISS. CODE ANN. § 1l-l-63(c)(ii) (Supp. 1996). The approach of the Final Draft is similar. See FINAL
DRAFT,supra note 59, § 2 cmts. i, j and k.
217. Wyeth Labs., Inc. v. Fortenberry, 530 So. 2d 688, 692 (Miss. 1988).
218. The learned intermediary doctrine permits the manufacturer under some circumstances to warn a
learned intermediary, such a medical professional, who supplies or supervises the use or consumption of the
product by the ultimate user or consumer. The manufacturer may rely on the intermediary, where such reliance
is reasonable, to appropriately instruct or warn the ultimate user or consumer. See Swan v. IP., Inc., 613 So. 2d
846, 855-56 (Miss. 1993); Wyeth Labs., 530 So. 2d at 691-92.
219. MISS. CODE ANN.§ I l-l-63(c)(ii) (Supp. 1996).
220. Thomas v. Hoffnan-LaRoche, 949 F.2d 806, 811 (5th Cir. 1992); Cather v. Catheter Tech. Corp., 753 F.
Supp. 634 (WD. Miss. 1991); Wyeth Labs., 530 So. 2d at 691-92.
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als such as physicians 221 The Act, while containing specific provisions as to
licensed professionals, does not appear to abrogate the learned intermediary doctrine with respect to other types of intermediaries, because the totality of the circumstances is to be considered in evaluation of a warning's or instruction's adequacy with respect to any product.222
Under the law prior to the Act, the scope of the duty to warn included an evaluation of whether, under the circumstances, a warning to the purchaser such as an
employer, rather than directly to the employee-user, was sufficient.223 Since the
Act requires the consideration of the "characteristics" of the purchaser, the question of whether the purchaser is likely to pass on warnings or instructions to
users or consumers would remain an issue for consideration as under the prior
law. The fact that the purchaser may have knowledge of the proper use and the
dangers of the product is not in and of itself sufficient to relieve the manufacturer of a duty to warn the ultimate user or consumer. 2 4 Reliance on the purchaser
to pass on information and warnings to the ultimate user must be reasonable.225
Under the law prior to the Act in a warnings claim, the plaintiff had the burden
of proving that she would have read and heeded a warning, had it been given by
the manufacturer. 226 Absent such proof, the plaintiff could not succeed in establishing causation from inadequate warnings. Under pre-Act Mississippi law as
applied by the Fifth Circuit, the plaintiff was not entitled to a presumption that
the plaintiff would have read and heeded the warnings.227
The Act, however, could be interpreted as leaving the question of a rebuttable
presumption open to development by the courts. A presumption that the plaintiff
would have read and heeded an adequate warning has gained widespread
approval in the courts, in part because it avoids the need for speculative testimony from the plaintiff about whether she would have heeded a warning.228 Since
the Mississippi Supreme Court has never addressed the issue of whether a plaintiff is entitled to a rebuttable presumption as a part of her proof of causation, the
matter remains undecided. If the Mississippi Supreme Court were to decide that
as a method of proof, the plaintiff is entitled to a judicially-adopted rebuttable
presumption that she would have read and heeded an adequate warning, the Act

221. See Swan, 613 So. 2d at 856 (discussing the doctrine in a claim against the manufacturer of a roofing
product).
222. Miss. CODE ANN. § 11-1-63(c)(ii) (Supp. 1996). Moreover, the Act's language is sufficiently broad to
allow warnings to be directed to appropriate intermediaries such as parents of young children or others where
communication with the ultimate consumer or user would be inappropriate or impractical and reliance on such
intermediaries is reasonable. This approach is in accord with the general rule in American courts. See
MADDEN, supra note 205, § 10.9, at 420-21.
223. Gordon v. Niagara Mach. & Tool Works, 574 F.2d 1182, 1188-89 (5th Cir. 1978) (applying Mississippi
law); Swan, 613 So. 2d at 855-56.
224. Little v. Liquid Air Corp., 952 E2d 841, 850-51 (5th Cir. 1992) (applying Miss. law); Swan, 613 So. 2d
at 855-56.
225. Swan, 613 So. 2d at 856.
226. Thomas v. Hoffinan-LaRoche, Inc., 949 E2d 806, 812-13 (5th Cir. 1992) (applying Mississippi law).
227. Id. In Thomas, the court found that the failure to mention any such presumption in a similar case by the
Mississippi Supreme Court created a strong inference that no such presumption exists under Mississippi law.
Id. However, the court did not rule out the possibility that in the type of warnings case where the proposed
warning would have addressed safe use as opposed to unavoidable risks, a rebuttable presumption may apply.
Id. at 813-14.
228. MADDEN, supra note 205, § 10.7, at 405.
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would not prohibit such proof. The Act merely requires that the plaintiff prove
proximate causation by a preponderance of the evidence; it does not specify the
method of such proof.229
2. Post-Sale Duty to Warn
Courts in the United States have come to recognize that under some circumstances, a duty to warn exists as to dangers existing at the point of transfer of
control from the manufacturer or seller but not discovered, regardless of fault,
until after the transfer of control from the manufacturer or seller.23 The Final
Draft adopts this approach, recognizing a post-sale duty to warn after the time of
23
sale "when a reasonable person . . . would provide such a warning." ' The
Mississippi Supreme Court has never addressed this issue nor have any federal
courts applying Mississippi law.
Because the Act deals only with dangers foreseeable at the time the product
left the control of the manufacturer or seller, it seems to preclude the development of a post-sale duty to warn doctrine in Mississippi. This author suggests
that the legislature consider adopting a reasonable post-sale duty to warn doctrine similar to or based on the Final Draft. Such a doctrine would not impose an
unreasonable duty on manufacturers, if appropriately circumscribed, but would
result in dissemination of potentially important and life-saving information to
Mississippi consumers.
C. Deviation Defect

Under the Act, liability for a deviation defect232 is strict. The Act provides that
the plaintiff must show, in addition to causation,2 33 that at the time the product
left the control of the manufacturer or seller,2 34 "[t]he product was defective
because it deviated in a material way from the manufacturer's specifications or
from otherwise identical units manufactured to the same manufacturing specifications, ' 235 and that the defect was unreasonably dangerous to the user or consumer. 236 In contrast to design or warning defects, the Act does not require proof

229. Miss. CODE ANN. § 1 1-1-63(a)(iii) (Supp. 1996).
230. E.g., Patton v. Hutchinson Wil-Rich Mfg. Co., 861 P2d 1299, 1344 (Kan. 1993).
231. FINAL DRAFT, supra note 59, § 10. See also id., §§ 10 and 11 (dealing with successor corporations' and

commercial sellers' duty of post-sale warning). Compare LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:2800.57C (West 1991)
(requiring reasonable care in providing warnings of danger discovered or which should have been discovered
after the product leaves the manufacturer's control). Compare also N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:58C-4 (West 1987);
OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2307.7(A)(2) (Banks-Baldwin 1994).

232. This type of defect has traditionally been referred to as a "manufacturing defect." However, this Article
uses the term "deviation defect" since the scope of the defect considered under this theory is broader than
defects that may occur just in the manufacturing stage. Deviation defects may occur at any point from manufacturing through the distribution stages prior to final transfer from a commercial distributor to a user or consumer. See FINAL DRAFT, supra note 59, § 2 cmt. b.
233. MISS. CODE ANN. § 1l-l-63(a)(iii) (Supp. 1996).
234. MISS. CODE ANN. § 11-1-63(a) (Supp. 1996).

235. MIss. CODE ANN. § 11-1-63(a)(i)(1) (Supp. 1996).
236. MISS. CODE ANN. § I l-l-63(a)(iii) (Supp. 1996).
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that the manufacturer or seller knew or should have known of the danger that
caused the harm.237 Fault in creating a deviation defect is irrelevant.
The deviation defect must be shown by the plaintiff to be "material."2"8 The
word "material" is not defined, but presumably the defect must be a deviation
that would affect product function or performance in a way that would cause the
product to present an unreasonable risk of harm23 9 not otherwise present in the
product produced according to manufacturer specifications. A claimant injured
by a product with a deviation that is found not to be material may alternatively
seek recovery under a design defect theory or a warnings defect theory on the
grounds that the product is unreasonably dangerous as designed or in the absence
of appropriate warnings.
The Act probably makes no change from the approach taken by the Mississippi
Supreme Court in applying Section 402A to deviation defects. The Act codifies
the prior rule that manufacturers, and probably sellers, are strictly liable for an
unreasonably dangerous deviation defect that causes harm to a user or
consumer.240 Because of its exclusive nature, however, the Act appears to eliminate negligence as an alternative theory of liability, although facts that would
support a finding of negligence would certainly be sufficient to prove a claim for
deviation defect under the Act.241 Nevertheless, proof of manufacturer or seller
fault in creating a deviation defect would be necessary in a claim for punitive
damages.242 Under previous law, the plaintiff was free to allege alternative theories of negligence or strict liability in a products liability case.243
D. Breach of Express Warranty
Under the Act, liability for breach of an express warranty or failure of the product to conform with an express factual representation, like liability for deviation
defect, is strict; i.e., the plaintiff need prove only that the breach or misrepresentation caused the harm, without having to prove fault leading to the breach or misrepresentation. 244 The term "express warranty" is not defined by the statute.

237. Miss. CODE ANN. § 1 -1-63(c)(i), (f)(ii) (Supp. 1996).
238. MISS. CODE ANN. § 1 -1-63(a)(i)(1) (Supp. 1996).
239. Miss. CODE ANN. § 1 -1-63(a)(ii) (Supp. 1996).
240. See State Stove Mfg. Co. v. Hodges, 189 So. 2d 113 (Miss. 1966) (manufacturers are strictly liable under
Section 402A); Scordino v. Hopeman Bros., Inc., 662 So. 2d 640, 646 (Miss. 1995) (dicta indicating that sellers
are strictly liable under 402A). See also PART I, supranote 2, at 420-22, for a discussion of strict liability under
Section 402A as applied to non-manufacturer sellers. See infra text at notes 257-282 for a discussion of ambiguities in the Act's language pertaining to manufacturer and seller liability.
241. But see Taylor v. General Motors Corp., 1996 WL 671648 (N.D. Miss., Aug. 6, 1996) ("The court finds
that after examining House Bill 1270, rules of construction, and the object and policy behind the Act, the legislature did not intend to abrogate the long established common law theory of negligence or the statutory cause of
action for breach of implied warranty."). For further discussion of Taylor and whether the Act is the exclusive
basis of product liability claims, see note 249, infra, and PART I, supranote 2, at 394.
242. See Miss. CODE ANN. §11-1-65 (1)(a) and (g) (Supp. 1996) (requiring clear and convincing evidence of
actual malice, gross negligence, or fraud).
243. See Toliver v. General Motors Corp., 482 So. 2d 213, 215 (Miss. 1985).
244. MIss. CODE ANN. § 11-1-63(a)(i)(4) (Supp. 1996).
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Presumably the concept, as used in the Act, will be identical to "express warranty" as provided by Mississippi's version of the Uniform Commercial Code.245
Under the language providing for liability if the product fails "to conform to
other express factual representations,"2 4 the plaintiff could assert a claim based
on express factual representations given by the manufacturer or seller that would
not qualify as an express warranty. In other words, representations that would
not qualify as a part of the "basis of the bargain" may provide a basis for a claim.
For example, a representation about the product by a manufacturer made to the
consumer after the sale may form the basis of a claim under this provision in situations where the representation does not relate back to and become a part of the
contract of sale. Also, the provision reaches representations made prior to a sale
that might not qualify as express warranties. This provision appears to represent
an adoption of a principle similar to that set forth in Section 402B of the
Restatement (Second) of Torts247 providing for strict liability for physical damages caused by misrepresentation to the public reasonably relied upon by a consumer or user. However, the recovery for misrepresentation in Mississippi is not
limited only to public representations. Representations made directly to the consumer or user by private communications are sufficient to support a claim.
In order to recover under a claim of breach of warranty or misrepresentation,
the plaintiff must prove both that she relied on the warranty or representation and
that the reliance was reasonable.248 Insofar as express warranties are concerned,
the reliance requirement may or may not represent a change in Mississippi law.249
In any event, the reliance requirement is consistent with the historical view, if not
the modern view.250 The reliance issue presents problems for users who are

245. Miss. CODE ANN. § 75-2-313 (1972). Under this statute:
(1) Express warranties by the seller are created as follows:
(a) Any affirmation of fact or promise made by the seller to the buyer which relates to the goods
and becomes part of the basis of the bargain creates an express warranty that the goods shall conform to the affirmation or promise.
(b) Any description of the goods which is made part of the basis of the bargain creates an express
warranty that the goods shall conform to the description.
(c) Any sample or model which is made part of the basis of the bargain creates an express warranty that the whole of the goods shall conform to the sample or model.
(2) It is not necessary to the creation of an express warranty that the seller use formal words such as
"warrant" or "guarantee" or that he have a specific intention to make a warranty, but an affirmation
merely of the value of the goods or a statement purporting to be merely the seller's opinion or commendation of the goods does not create a warranty.
Id.
246. MISS. CODE ANN. § 1 1-l-63(a)(i)(4) (Supp. 1996).
247. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, § 402B (1965) provides the following:
One engaged in the business of selling chattels who, by advertising, labels, or otherwise, makes to
the public a misrepresentation of a material fact concerning the character or quality of a chattel sold
by him is subject to liability for physical harm to a consumer of the chattel caused by justifiable
reliance upon the misrepresentation, even though (a) it is not made fraudulently or negligently, and
(b) the consumer has not bought the chattel from or entered into any contractual relation with the
seller.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND)OF TORTS, §402B (1965). The Act, unlike Section 402B imposes an "unreasonably dangerous" requirement, however. MISS. CODE ANN. § 11-1-63(a)(ii) (Supp. 1996). See infra text accompanying
notes 255-57.
248. MISS. CODE ANN. § 11-1-63 (a)(i)(4) (Supp. 1996).
249. See PART I, supra note 2, at 397, 424 n.281.
250. MADDEN, supra note 205, § 2.10, at 37.
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unaware of the manufacturer's express warranty, such as employees of the product purchaser, or family members of the product purchasers. In such cases, a
2 51
remedy must be based on another theory of defect.
While the word "defect" or "defective" does not appear in the provision establishing breach of warranty or misrepresentation as a basis of a products liability
claim, the Act appears to treat a breach of express warranty or misrepresentation
as a "defective condition."25 2 The Act requires the plaintiff to prove under any
theory of liability provided by the Act that the "defective condition rendered the
product unreasonably dangerous.""2
This additional requirement represents a

251. As shown in PART I the possibility exists that such persons could not sue on the basis of an implied warranty either, since the Act purports to govern all claims for damages caused by products and implied warranties
are omitted as basis for a products liability claim. PART I, supranote 2, at 394, 424. If so, the practical effects
of the abolition of a privity requirement, see MISS. CODE ANN. § 11-7-20, are mostly lost. Indeed, in Rogers v.
Elk River Safety Belt Co., No. CIV 1:95CV115-D.D., 1996 WL 671316 at *3 (N.D. Miss. Sept. 20, 1996) (rendered after the completion of Part 1), the court, on motion for summary judgment, dismissed the plaintiff's
product liability claim based on a theory of implied warranty "[b]ecause the statute does not provide for recovery for breach of implied warranty." Cf Satcher v. Honda Motor Co., 855 F Supp. 886, 890-91 (S.D. Miss.
1994), cert. denied, 116 S.Ct. 705 (1996) ("If House Bill 1270 was merely a codification of existing law immediately pre-Prestage,... the legislature would have no reason to delay the effect of the substantive portions of
the bill . . . until ... more than a year after its adoption. House Bill 1270 does not merely codify [the] law as it
existed prior to Prestage. It substantially changed the law."). Cf, Taylor v. General Motors Corp., 1996 WL
671648 (N.D. Miss. Aug. 6, 1996) ("The court finds that after examining House Bill 1270, rules of construction, and the object and policy behind the Act, the legislature did not intend to abrogate the long established
common law theory of negligence or the statutory cause of action for breach of implied warranty."). This
author respectfully disagrees with Judge Biggers on the issue of negligence. It seems clear that the legislature
intended the statute to consolidate theories of products liability, actually doing away with true strict liability
except in instances of deviation defects and breaches of express warranty. The statute abolishes the traditional
distinction between strict liability (imputed knowledge of danger) and negligence (knew or should have known
of the danger) in design cases in favor of a unified approach to products liability cases based on a negligenceoriented approach in design and warnings cases. See supra text accompanying notes 50-56 (discussing defects)
and notes 198-229 (discussing warning defects). Thus, negligence as a separate theory of liability would serve
little use in design cases or warnings cases. The statute never uses the terms "negligence" or "strict liability,"
an indication that the legislature intended the Act to cover all prior theories of products liability claims.
Moreover, the legislature makes complete defenses of open and obvious danger of a defect, at least as to warnings cases, see infra text accompanying notes 286-9 1, and assumption of the risk, see infra text accompanying
notes 303-18. To allow these defenses as complete bars in actions under the Act but not under alternative theories outside of the Act's coverage would be anamolous. Under a negligence action, if such survives outside of
the coverage of the Act, an open and obvious defense would only reduce recovery. See Seymour v. Brunswick,
655 So. 2d 892, 894 (Miss. 1995); Tharp v. Bunge Corp., 641 So. 2d 20, 25 (Miss. 1994). Assumption of the
risk is likely to be absorbed into comparative negligence. See Horton v. American Tobacco Corp., 667 So. 2d
1289, 1292, 1306 (Miss. 1995). The legislature clearly intends open and obvious danger (in warnings cases)
and assumption of the risk to remain as a separate and complete defense in products liability actions.
Moreover, if the consumer expectations test is revived in design cases under the Act, an open and obvious danger stands as a bar to the plaintiffs claim. See supra text accompanying notes 95-115 and infra text accompanying notes 300-02. Under Judge Bigger's view, the plaintiff could succeed in recovery in a negligence action but
not in an action under the Act for the same injury. The legislature is unlikely to have intended such a result. As
to the continued viability of implied warranty, there is room for greater doubt as to the legislative intent given
the problems created by the statute as to implied warranty theory, especially to the extent that interests traditionally provided protection are denied such protection. See PART I, supra note 2, at 423-24. Even as to implied
warranty, however, there seems to be little reason for the legislature to seek to restrict the application of strict
liability in design cases only to have strict liability remain in implied warranty cases. But ef Denny v. Ford
Motor Co., 662 N.E.2d 730, 739 (N.Y. 1995) (holding that even if there is no alternative design available, thus
barring a common law tort claim in strict products liability, an implied warranty action may lie).
252. MIss. CODE ANN. § 1 -1-63(a)(ii), (iii) (Supp. 1996).
253. MISS. CODE ANN. § 11-1-63(a)(ii) (Supp. 1996).
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change in the law. Under the prior law, the plaintiff was not required to show the
product was unreasonably dangerous in a breach of warranty claim." 4
As discussed in PartI of this article, the Act does not define the term "unreasonably dangerous.""2 ' Depending on the category of defect asserted, the definition appears to vary somewhat. For design defect claims, proof of the availability of an alternative design and proof of consumer expectations are mandatory
elements in deciding whether a product is unreasonably dangerous. 5 6 In breach
of express warranty or misrepresentation cases, the availability of alternative
design is not a consideration. The appropriate analysis in a warranty claim
requires a determination of whether a reasonable person would have relied on the
representation and, if so, whether the breach or misrepresentation created a risk
of harm to the user or consumer that a reasonable consumer or user would have
chosen not to encounter had she had full knowledge or been given the correct
information. The liability is strict because foreseeability of the danger created by
the breach of the warranty or the misrepresentation is not a requirement of the
plaintiff's case.
III.

MANUFACTURER/SELLER DISTINCTION: WHO Is LIABLE FOR WHAT?

One of the most perplexing ambiguities created by the Act's language is
whether the nonmanufacturer seller is liable for design or warning defects existing in a product prior to the product's coming into the seller's control when the
defect is not known or reasonably knowable to the seller. Professor Harges has
suggested that the language merely makes the seller strictly liable for an unreasonably dangerous defect (whether one of deviation, design, warning, or warranty) that exists before the product leaves the seller's control.257 However, the language of the Act is sufficiently ambiguous to create doubt that sellers are strictly
liable for design and warnings defects. Even as to deviation defects and breaches
of express warranty, some ambiguity exists.
Under Section 402A, the seller is liable if the product "is expected to and does
reach the user or consumer without substantial change in the condition in which
it is sold."2 8 Thus, if the condition of the product changes after it leaves the control of a particular seller in the chain of distribution, that seller is not liable for
any defect resulting from the change. For example, if a change in a product's
condition occurs causing the product to be unreasonably dangerous while the
product is in the control of the wholesaler, both the wholesaler and the retailer
who later sells the product are liable to the injured user or consumer. The manufacturer, however, would not be liable for the defective condition caused by the
change occurring while the wholesaler had control of the product.29

254. Harges, supranote 47, at 725, 728.
255. PART I, supra note 2, at 431-36 (discussing how the term might be interpreted and applied to users,
bystanders and property).
256. MIss. CODE ANN. § 11-1-63(f)(i), (ii) (Supp. 1996). See also supra text accompanying notes 1601-64,
(feasible alternative design) and notes 76-85 (consumer expectations).
257. Harges, supra note 47, at 707-09.
258. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A(b) (1965).

259. Id., cmt. p.
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Unfortunately, the Act is not as clear as Section 402A as to the extent of liability of the nonmanufacturer seller and the manufacturer. The Act provides that
"the manufacturer or seller" is not liable unless the plaintiff proves that the product was defective at the time that the product "left the control of the manufacturer or seller."26 The Act appears to draw a distinction between seller and manufacturer, though it does not define either term.2" 1 Other than for indemnity purposes,262 the purpose of the distinction is not readily apparent. The Act's use of
the conjunction "or" renders the meaning ambiguous. For example, one might
conclude that the plaintiff may recover from either the manufacturer or the seller
for a defect occurring while in the other's possession. Under this literal reading,
the manufacturer could be held liable for defects occurring after the product left
the manufacturer's control if the defect existed before the product left the hands
of the retailer. Such an interpretation would expand manufacturer liability beyond that of prior law. No support exists in the academic literature or in judicial
decisions for such a rule. The legislature did not likely intend this interpretation,
nor is it likely that the courts would adopt such a view, although, the language
could yield such an approach.
Because a literal interpretation would yield an unintended expansion of manufacturer liability, the court must seek an interpretation that will best yield a result
consistent with the policies underlying the Act.263 Unfortunately, the Act leaves
open a choice between two reasonable, but competing policies, either of which
can be inferred from the Act. The court could choose to impose strict liability on
the seller for all defects that occur upstream in the chain of distribution or while
the product is under the seller's control, or the court could choose to impose liability solely on the basis of seller fault for design and warnings defects.
To recover from a seller in a design or warnings case, the plaintiff must prove
both that the defect existed when the product left the control of the manufacturer
or seller and that the manufacturer or seller knew or should have known of the
danger.264 The court must decide whether the Act imposes liability in such a case
based (1) only on seller fault or (2) based on either seller fault or seller vicarious
liability for manufacturer fault. Under the former approach, the plaintiff must
establish seller fault independently of the manufacturer fault.265 Under the latter
approach the plaintiff can recover by establishing the fault of either the seller or
the manufacturer.
The Act creates doubt because the use of the conjunction "or" implies equality
of treatment as to the basis of liability for manufacturers and sellers. The lan-

260. MISS. CODE ANN.§ I1-1-63(a) (Supp. 1996) (emphasis added).
261. See PARr 1, supra note 2, at 410-13 (discussing the term "manufacturer") and 414-20 (discussing the
term "seller").
262. See Miss. CODE ANN. § 11-1-63(g) (Supp. 1996). See also infra text accompanying notes 324-26.
263. See Evans v. Boyle Flying Serv., Inc., 680 So. 2d 821 (1996).
264. MISS. CODE ANN. § 1l-1-63(c)(i), (f) (Supp. 1996).

265. Cf H.R. 956, 104th Cong., 2d Sess. (1996) (Common Sense Product Liability Legal Reform Act of
1996) (vetoed by President Clinton, May 2, 1996) (providing that nonmanufacturer distributors of products are
liable only if at fault or unless the manufacturer is not subject to the court's jurisdiction or a judgment against
the manufacturer would be unenforceable).
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guage pertaining to design and warnings defects can be reasonably read to
require liability based only on the fault of the particular defendant against whom
the plaintiff claims. Such a result would preserve the apparent equality of treatment implied by the language of the Act. A literal interpretation, as shown,
would result in an unacceptably expanded liability for the manufacturer. On the
other hand, imposing vicarious liability on the seller denies the seller the equality
of treatment implied by the Act's language. The seller would have greater liability for exposure, being liable both for seller and manufacturer fault in design and
warnings cases.

66

From the retailer's point of view, the approach limiting retailer liability in
design and warnings cases to retailer fault on the issue of knowledge of the dan67
2
ger is consistent with the purpose of protecting Mississippi businesses,

of

placing the liability on those who are most able to cope with the loss,2"8 and of
placing liability on the person who is most likely to be at fault in creating the
design or warning defect. Moreover, the restriction on strict liability also satisfies the view that moral considerations lead to regarding fault as the primary
basis of liability in the tort system.26 9
On the other hand, the strict liability view imposing vicarious liability on
retailers and wholesalers for the fault of manufacturers, is consistent with a policy of encouraging retailers and wholesalers to do business with reputable, careful, and financially answerable manufacturers,27 and of encouraging retailers
and wholesalers to demand and expect manufacturers to exercise due care in the
production of products.271 Strict liability for sellers provides convenience to consumers in reaching a responsible party in the event the manufacturer is too
remote,272 and gives greater protection against financial loss to consumers caused
by defective products.273 Strict liability for sellers allows the loss to fall on the
innocent party who benefits from the sale of the defective product, 274 and protects the general expectations of consumers regarding the safety and suitability of
products that they purchase and use. 75
Under a strict or vicarious liability approach to seller liability for defective
design and warnings, the Act could be interpreted consistently with the approach

266. Under Section 402A, this problem does not exist because the term "seller" includes manufacturers and
there is no ambiguity in the language. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A, cmt. f(1965).
267. Large manufacturers are more likely to be out-of-state, while retailers are more likely to be located in
Mississippi.
268. Manufacturers often have greater financial stature than locally owned and operated retailers.
269. See David G. Owen, The Moral Foundations of Products Liability Law: Toward First Principles,68
NOTRE DAME L. REv. 427, 453 (1993).
270. Sellers who are not at fault may seek indemnity from the manufacturer. See MIss. COOE ANN. § 11-163(g)(i) (Supp. 1996). Presumably, sellers are more likely to do business with manufacturers who are financially capable of indemnifying the seller than those who are not. Sellers also are more likely to buy from manufacturers who will exercise care in production of products to reduce the risk of product liability claims against the
seller and manufacturer.
271. Vandermark v. Ford Motor Co., 391 P.2d 168, 171 (Cal. 1964).
272. Id. See also, Marshall S. Shapo, THE LAW OF PRODUCTS LIABILITY, § 12.04[4] (3d ed. 1994).
273. Cf Birnbaum, supra note 66, at 596 (1980).
274. Id.; State Stove Mfg. Co. v. Hodges, 189 So. 2d 113, 120 (Miss. 1966).
275. Cf Markle v. Mulholland's, Inc., 509 P2d 529, 532-34 (Or. 1973); Twerski & Weinstein, supra note 57,
at 23 1.
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taken under Section 402A, meaning that a particular seller in the chain of distribution is liable for defects occurring upstream as well as those that occur while
the product is in the possession of that seller.176 Thus, the manufacturer is liable
only for deviation defects and breaches of express warranty existing in the product when it left the manufacturer's control and not those occuring subsequently in
the chain of distribution. In contrast as to warnings and design defects under the
Act, the manufacturer is liable for such defects only if the manufacturer was at
fault.2" In deviation defect or express warranty cases, retailers are strictly liable
for defects in the product that exist prior to the product leaving the retailer's control, regardless of retailer fault. However, in design and warnings cases, in order
to hold the retailer liable, the plaintiff must show either that the manufacturer
was at fault (thus, strict or vicarious liability for the retailer) or that the retailer
was at fault. Arguably, this view is what the legislature most likely intended and
represents an adoption of a view similar to the approach of Section 402A, thoroughly overruling the Shainberg Doctrine which protected retailers from strict
278
liability in Mississippi.
The indemnity provision of the Act allowing sellers to seek indemnity from
manufacturers 279 seems to support the view favoring expanded liability for sellers. One could argue that the existence of the indemnity provision implies an
intent of the legislature to hold sellers vicariously liable for the defects created by
the manufacturer. Since sellers are entitled to claim indemnity unless the seller
is at fault, 280 strict liability may be inferred in cases where the seller is not at fault

and the plaintiff otherwise has a valid claim. Additional support for the view that
the seller is strictly liable for any actionable defect created by the manufacturer
may be found in the fact that no provision is made for the case where the manufacturer is not subject to the jurisdiction of a Mississippi court or is insolvent or
where a judgment is not likely to be enforceable against the manufacturer. In the
absence of strict liability under the Act for the seller in such circumstances, the
plaintiff would be without a remedy for an otherwise actionable defect. 281 This
reading is likely to be the reading adopted by the court if the court seeks to preserve greater rights of recovery for the injured plaintiff.
However, a close reading of the indemnity provision does not yield an unambiguous inference of strict liability for the nonmanufacturer sellers. One may
read the indemnity provision consistently with a limited exposure for sellers.
This provision may be read as setting forth a right of indemnity in design or
warnings defect claims if the seller did not actually know of the danger, but
276. See also FINAL DRAFr, supranote 59, § 1.
277. See supra text accompanying notes 48-53, 57-86 (discussing foreseeability and alternative design
requirements) and notes 196-204 (discussing fault in warnings).
278. Harges, supra note 47, at 765-69. See also PART I, supra note 2, at 420-22 for a discussion of the viability of the ShainbergDoctrine under the law prior to the Act.
279. MIss. CODE ANN. § 11-1-63(g)(i) (Supp. 1996).
280. Id.
281. Cf MODEL ACT, supra note 113, § 105 (providing for non-manufacturer strict liability for defects when
the manufacturer is outside the court's jurisdiction, is insolvent, or a judgment is likely to be unenforceable
against the manufacturer); but cf NEB. REV. STAT. § 25-21,181 (1995)(prohibiting strict liability claims in tort
against non-manufacturer sellers and lessors).
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should have known, and if the seller did not substantially control the design or
production of the defective aspect of the product, make alterations or modifications in the product that were a substantial factor in causing the harm, or make
express factual representations about the aspect of the product that caused the
harm.282 Thus, the seller who is only passively negligent as to knowledge of the
danger may seek indemnity. Under this reading, if the seller did not know of the
danger and had no reason to know of the danger, the plaintiff may not recover
from the seller and the indemnity issue is moot. This reading is possible under
the Act without doing harm to the language and is consistent with the view that
sellers should not be strictly or vicariously liable in design and warnings cases.
In sum, the Act appears to impose strict liability on both sellers and manufacturers for deviation defects and breaches of express warranty or other express
representations. The better view is that a defendant is liable for upstream deviation or misrepresentation defects and those that occur while the product is in that
defendant's control. As to design and warnings defects, the more likely result is
that the Act imposes strict liabilty on a seller for such defects that occur upstream
in the chain of distribution or while under the seller's control. Manufacturers,
however, are liable for such defects only if they are at fault with regard to knowledge of the danger.
IV.

DEFENSES

The Act specifically provides that an open and obvious danger is a complete
bar to a claim in defective warnings case, 2 and that assumption of the risk is a
complete bar in all claims under the Act.284 The Act also expressly preserves all
common law defenses to a products liability claim.28 This section of the Article
discusses the statutory and common law defenses.
A. Open and Obvious Defects or Dangers
The Act provides that in any claim of defective warnings or instructions, "the
manufacturer or seller shall not be liable if the danger posed by the product is
known or is open and obvious."28 Whether the danger is known or open and
obvious is judged by a subjective standard - if the danger was known or perceived as open and obvious by the user or consumer.287 If the user or consumer
did not actually know of the danger, knowledge of the danger or the obviousness
of the danger is judged by an objective standard.288 In applying this objective
standard, the trier of fact should take "into account the characteristics of, and the

§ 11-1-63(g)(1) (Supp. 1996).
§ 11-1-63(e) (Supp. 1996).
§ 11-1-63(d) (Supp. 1996).
§ 11-1-63(h) (Supp. 1996).
286. MISS. CODE ANN. § 11-1-63(e) (Supp. 1996).
287. Id. The Act provides in a warnings claim that the manufacturer or seller is not liable "if the danger
posed by the product is known or is open and obvious to the user or consumer of the product .. " Id.
288. Id. The Act provides that the manufacturer or seller is not liable if the danger "should have been known
or open and obvious to the user or consumer .. " Id.
282.
283.
284.
285.

Miss. CODE
MISS. CODE
MISS. CODE
MIss. CODE

ANN.
ANN.
ANN.
ANN.
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ordinary knowledge common to, the persons who ordinarily use or consume the
' 9
product. 28

The "open and obvious" defense as a complete defense in a warnings case does
not appear to be a change in the law. Courts applying Mississippi law have consistently held that there is no need to warn of an open and obvious defect.29
Since the adoption of a risk-utility analysis making the open and obvious nature
of a defect only one factor in evaluating whether a product is unreasonably dangerous, the Mississippi Supreme Court has not dealt with whether an open or
obvious danger will defeat a warnings claim. Nevertheless, the court likely
would not have abrogated the open and obvious danger defense in warnings
cases arising under pre-Act law. The lack of warnings of an open and obvious
danger plays no causal role in the harm. As noted in the comments to the Final
Draft, "[w]arning of an obvious or generally known risk in most instances will
not provide an additional measure of safety.'291 Thus, even under a risk-utility
analysis, no warning of an open and obvious danger should be required.
With respect to open and obvious dangers in other contexts, such as deviation
defect, design defect, and warranty cases, the effect of an open and obvious danger is not as clearly addressed by the Act. Perhaps only in deviation defects will
an open and obvious danger not bar recovery totally.292 In warranty cases, the
reliance on the express warranty or factual representation must be justifiable.293
If a danger inconsistent with the warranty or representation is known or open and
obvious, one may well conclude that the reliance was not reasonable or justifiable, barring the plaintiff's recovery. In design cases, the plaintiff must show that
'
the product "failed to function as expected."294
In such cases, if a danger is open
and obvious, the fact that the product caused an injury as a result of the open and
obvious danger may well defeat the plaintiff's claim.295 However, plaintiff's loss
will not come as a result of an affirmative defense but because the plaintiff failed
to prove all the elements of her claim.
In dicta, courts have pointed out that the Act re-established the open and obvious danger doctrine in warnings cases.29 In Seymour v. Brunswick,29 7 the
supreme court stated that the open and obvious defense under the Act is only
applicable in warnings cases.298 Technically the court is correct; the open and

289. Id.
290. See supra text accompanying notes 205-06. See also Seymour v. Brunswick Corp., 655 So. 2d 892, 894
n.2 (Miss. 1995) (indicating that the open and obvious defense is "inherently applicable" to warnings and
instructions cases).
291. FINAL DRAFT, supra note 59, § 2 cmt. i.
292. In the context of deviation defects, the statute is silent as to the effect of open and obvious dangers.
Presumably the common law will govern any defenses in this regard. The supreme court has abolished the
defense as a complete bar at common law. Tharp v. Bunge Corp., 641 So. 2d 20, 25 (Miss. 1994).
293. Miss. CODE ANN. § I I-1-63(a)(i)4 (Supp. 1996).
294. Miss. CODE ANN. § I l-l-63(f)(ii) (Supp. 1996).
295. See supra text accompanying notes 94-114.
296. Satcher v. Honda Motor Co., Ltd., 855 F. Supp. 886, 890 (S.D. Miss. 1994), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 705
(1996); Batts v. Tow-Lift Forklift Co., 153 ER.D. 103, 107 (N.D. Miss. 1994), rev don other grounds, 66 F.3d
743 (5th Cir. 1995); Materials Transp. Co. v. Newman, 656 So. 2d 1199, 1203 (Miss. 1995); Seymour v.
Brunswick Corp., 655 So. 2d 892, 894 (Miss. 1995).
297. 655 So. 2d 892 (Miss. 1995).

1997]

TORT REFORM IN MISSISSIPPI

obvious defense as an affirmative defense is applicable only in such cases
because the defense must raise the issue and prove the point.
The specific inclusion of the "open and obvious" defense for warnings cases
may be somewhat superfluous because the plaintiff bears the burden of proving
that the danger was one that the ordinary user or consumer would not realize.299
Despite the recognition of an open and obvious danger as a defense by the Act,
the burden has actually been shifted to the plaintiff to disprove that the product
had a danger that was open and obvious. Only in cases where the defense contends that the plaintiff subjectively knew of the danger does the defendant truly
bear the burden of proof.
In stating that the Act restores the open and obvious defense only in warnings
cases, the courts have apparently overlooked, and not yet addressed, the issue of
the plaintiff's burden of proof in design and breach of warranty cases. In proving
that the product was defectively designed, the requirement that the plaintiff must
prove that the product failed to function as expected, as a corollary appears to
require the plaintiff to show that the defect was not open and obvious. 0
Similarly, in breach of warranty cases, the plaintiff must prove reasonable
reliance. The court may well determine that reliance is unreasonable as a matter
of law when the defect is known or obvious. While the courts correctly state that
the open and obvious defense does not apply in cases other than warnings cases
to bar recovery, the burden is on the plaintiff to prove the defects claimed were
not open and obvious in design and warranty cases.30 1 A defendant well may
introduce evidence to rebut the plaintiff's evidence that the alleged defect was
not open and obvious, but the burden of proof remains with the plaintiff.
Under the Act, the open and obvious defense is not a true affirmative defense,
except in deviation cases or in cases where the plaintiff subjectively knows of the
danger in a warnings case. A true affirmative defense is one that defeats the
302
plaintiff's claim despite the fact that the plaintiff has met her burden of proof.
In design cases, warnings cases where the danger is measured objectively, and
warranty cases, evidence offered by the defense as to the plaintiff's knowledge or
the obviousness of the defect serves to rebut the plaintiff's proof of defect rather
than to defeat the claim despite the plaintiff having met all of her elements of
proof.

298. Id. at 894.
299. MISS. CODE ANN. § I I-1-63(c)(i) (Supp. 1996). See supra text accompanying notes 212-15.
300. See supra text accompanying notes 95-115.
301. Even under the former consumer expectations approach, the issue is not whether open and obvious danger is an affirmative defense; rather it is whether the plaintiff proved that the product failed to function as
expected. The abolition of the open and obvious defense as a bar in design cases actually is a lessening of the
plaintiff's burden in proving that the product was unreasonably dangerous. Under the former approach, the
plaintiff need not show, as a required element, that the product failed to function as expected. Such evidence
would be a factor to consider in evaluating whether the design is unreasonably dangerous. However, to reduce
the plaintiff's recovery, the defendant would be required to plead the plaintiff's contributory negligence in proceeding to use the product in light of the known or obvious danger.
302. For example, a statute of limitations defense is an affirmative defense because it must be pleaded and
proved by the defendant and is effective despite the plaintiff's successful proof of defendant's fault.
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B. Assumption of Risk

The Act makes assumption of risk a complete defense to any products liability
claim. To establish the defense under the Act, the defendant 3 3 must show that
the claimant "(i) had knowledge of a condition of the product that was inconsistent with his safety; (ii) appreciated the danger in the condition; and (iii) deliberately and voluntarily chose to expose himself to the danger in such a manner to
register assent on the continuance of the dangerous condition."3 4 The elements
of the defense prescribed are taken nearly verbatim from Mississippi case law. 0
The continued viability of assumption of risk as a separate defense from contributory negligence or fault has been in serious doubt for some time.30 6 A plurality of the court has indicated that the doctrine of assumption of the risk should
be abolished and absorbed into Mississippi comparative negligence rules. 7
Nevertheless, at least in products liability claims, assumption of risk as a comvitality in circumplete bar is alive and well in Mississippi. The defense retains
30 8
apply.
not
might
negligence
contributory
which
in
stances
The Mississippi Supreme Court has held that in cases where contributory negligence doctrine and assumption of risk doctrine overlap, the rules of contributory, hence comparative, negligence control.3 ' The court has applied this approach
to situations in which the evidence showed that the plaintiff arguably was merely
careless as opposed to venturous, 3 1 or in which the plaintiff was aware of general
risk, but not the specific risk. 11 As the court has recognized, the assumption of
risk defense simply should not apply to cases of plaintiff's mere carelessness or
knowledge of a general danger.312 However, in cases where the plaintiff has specific knowledge of the danger, appreciates the danger, and voluntarily encounters
it, the defense should apply. Nevertheless the court only rarely has found that the

303. The Act does not expressly place the burden on the defendant to prove assumption of risk, but the better
reading of the Act leads to that conclusion.
304. MISS. CODE ANN. § 11-1-63(d) (Supp. 1996).
305. Yarbrough v. Phipps, 285 So. 2d 788, 791 (Miss. 1973) ("Three elements of inquiry, which must be
pointed out to the jury in an assumption of risk instruction, are whether: (1) the injured party has knowledge of
the condition inconsistent with her safety; (2) the injured party appreciatedthe danger in the condition; and (3)
the injured party deliberately and voluntarily chose to expose herself to that danger in such a manner as to register assent on the continuance of the dangerous situation.").
306. See Olger C. Twyner, III, A Survey and Analysis of Comparative Fault in Mississippi, 52 Miss. L.J. 563,
574-79 (1982).
307. Horton v. American Tobacco Co., 667 So. 2d 1289, 1306 (Miss. 1995).
308. See W PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 68, at 495 (5th ed. 1984)
("The plaintiff may assume the risk where the conduct of defendant is willful, wanton, or reckless, where his
").
ordinary negligence is no defense ....
309. Braswell v. Economy Supply Co., 281 So. 2d 669, 677 (1973). See Twyner, supra note 306, at 577-78
(criticizing the rule as unnecessary). The overlap of assumption of risk with contributory negligence occurs
when the plaintiff's voluntary choice and voluntarily encountering of a risk is unreasonable. KEETON ET AL.,
supra note 308, § 68, at 481.
310. E.g., Huffinan v. Walker Jones Equip. Co., 658 So. 2d 871, 874 (Miss. 1995).
311. Id. (Plaintiff testified that she was aware of the risk of climbing on an unstable scaffold, but it did not
occur to her that there was a risk that someone on the scaffold would drop something on her head while she was
standing by the scaffold.). In general, the cases in which the court has found an "overlap" tend to be cases
where assumption of risk may not have been applicable if properly understood.
312. Id. at 873.
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assumption of risk defense applies. 13 In this respect, the Act is unlikely to
change the notion of assumption of risk except to reinforce its recognition as a
defense apart from contributory negligence.
The significance of assumption of risk as a defense may be found in cases
where the product arguably failed to function as expected, if this expectation is
measured objectively,3 14 and the danger was nevertheless actually known to the
user or consumer. The defense may also be significant in deviation defect cases
because an open and obvious danger does not completly bar recovery, but a subjective assumption of risk is a complete bar.
The court in recent years has attempted to restrict and narrow the assumption
of risk defense.3 15 The most recent example is the case of Wilks v. American
Tobacco Company.3"' In Wilks, the court held that a defendant may not raise the
defense of assumption of risk where the defense does not admit that the product
posed a risk.317 This opinion appears to seriously restrict the ability of defendants to raise the defense because the defendant cannot both deny the risk and
alternatively assert that if a risk did exist, the plaintiff assumed that risk. If a
defendant chooses to oppose the plaintiff's assertion that a risk existed, Wilks
appears to foreclose use of the assumption of the risk defense, even if the plaintiff succeeds in proving that the risk did exist.
Whether the use of assumption of the risk will be similarly restricted under the
Act remains to be seen. Nothing in the Act's language seems to require the
defendant to admit that an unsafe condition existed in the product before the
defense can be raised. Indeed, if the plaintiff can succeed in proving that an
unsafe condition existed in the product, no logical reason exists to bar the defendant from showing that the plaintiff knew of the condition and appreciated the
danger. A denial of the existence of the danger in the first place should not bar
proof of the plaintiff's knowledge if the plaintiff has shown that the danger existed. For example, assume that the parties dispute whether the brakes on plaintiff's
new car were mismanufactured. If plaintiff proves that the brakes were mismanufactured and unreasonably dangerous, there is no reason to prohibit the manufacturer who disputes the plaintiff's claim from showing that the plaintiff knew
of the defect, knew of and appreciated the danger, and voluntarily chose to drive
anyway. If the plaintiff admits that she voluntarily drove the car knowing that the
brakes were in a dangerous condition, the defendant should be able to raise the
defense despite the denial that the defect actually existed.

313. Yarbrough v. Phipps, 285 So. 2d 788, 790 (Miss. 1973). For an excellent discussion of the application of
the assumption of risk doctrine in Mississippi, see Richardson v. Clayton & Lambert Manufacturing Co., 657 E
Supp. 751 (N.D. Miss. 1987).
314. See supra text accompanying notes 76-85.
315. See Twyner, supra note 306, at 576.
316. 680 So. 2d 839 (Miss. 1996).
317. Id. at 843.
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C. Other Defenses

The Act expressly retains other common law defenses to an action for damages
caused by a product. 18 Among these defenses are misuse, alteration, and other
intervening, superceding causes. Under the common law of Mississippi, unforeseeable misuse of a product is an absolute bar to a plaintiff's claim.3 19 A substantial alteration has been recognized as a bar to recovery, as well. 320 In any event,

however, the plaintiff bears the burden of proving that the defect existed at the
time the product left the control of the manufacturer or seller. 2 1 Proof of alteration amounts to showing that the plaintiff has not sustained her burden of proof
as to the time of the defect's existence. In addition, the court has recognized that
the intervening conduct of a third person may amount to a superceding cause sufficient to break the chain of causation. 22
Contributory negligence is also available as a defense to reduce the plaintiff's
recovery in a negligence claim. 23 Contributory negligence is likely to be an
affirmative defense under the Act as well. 324 The fact that the Act contains both
strict liability aspects and negligence aspects supports application of contributory negligence to reduce the plaintiff's recovery in a claim under the Act. The
Mississippi Supreme Court has not expressly held that contributory negligence is
applicable in a strict liability claim, but its applicability has been assumed. 25
V

INDEMNITY, JOINT AND SEVERAL LIABILITY, AND CONTRIBUTION

The Act expressly provides the nonmanufacturer seller who is liable to a
claimant under the Act with a right of indemnity against a manufacturer who is
also found liable for damages caused by a defective product.3 26 The right of
indemnity includes recovery for litigation costs, reasonable expenses, reasonable
attorney's fees, and any damages awarded by the trier of fact. 327 The Act, however, limits the right of indemnity to cases where the seller played a passive role
with respect to the creation of or knowledge of the defect. Thus, the seller is not
entitled to indemnification if the seller exercised "substantial control over that
aspect of the design, testing, manufacture, packaging or labeling of the product";
if the seller altered or modified the product in a manner that was a substantial
factor in causing the harm; if the seller had actual knowledge of the defect at the

318. MIss. CODE ANN. § 11-1-63(h) (Supp. 1996).
319. Ford Motor Co. v. Matthews, 291 So. 2d 169, 174 (Miss. 1974). See also Whittley v. City of Meridian,
530 So. 2d 1341, 1347 (Miss. 1988).
320. Whittley, 530 So. 2d at 1347.
321. MISS. CODE ANN. § 11-1-63(a) (Supp. 1996).
322. Whitiley, 530 So. 2d at 1347; E.I. DuPont DeNemours & Co. v. Ladner, 73 So. 2d 249, 255-56 (Miss.
1954).
323. MISS. CODE ANN. §11-7-15 (1972).
324. See Harges, supra note 47, at 752 (arguing that the Comparative Fault Statute is sufficiently broad to
apply to products liability claims).
325. See Horton v. American Tobacco Co., 667 So. 2d 1289, 1292-93 (Miss. 1995) (plurality opinion discussing plaintiff's contributory negligence in regard to a claim that cigarettes were unreasonably dangerous).
326. MISS. CODE ANN. § 1l-l-63(g)(i) (Supp. 1996).
327. Id. Presumably the damages are the damages awarded to the party injured by the product.
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time of supplying the product; or if the seller made express factual representations about that aspect of the product that caused the harm. 28
The Mississippi Supreme Court has not issued any reported opinions dealing
with nonmanufacturer seller indemnity claims. However, to the extent that the
Shainberg Doctrine329 was discarded by the court prior to the Act, indemnity
claims prior to the Act would not have looked substantially different. In Bush v.
City of Laurel,"' the court stated that an indemnity obligation may arise from "a

contractual relation, from an implied contractual relation, or out of liability
'
imposed by law."331
In general, a party who did not create the dangerous situation, who is only passively negligent, or who is liable only because of a non-delegable statutory duty may be entitled to indemnity from the active wrongdoer. 32
In a common law indemnity action, the indemnitee may recover reasonable attorney's fees, reasonable expenses, including court costs and interest, and the
amount paid to the claimant.33
In deliniating seller conduct that bars an indemnity claim, the Act includes
"express factual representation[s] about the ... product which caused the harm
for which recovery of damages is sought. ' 334 To the extent that such representa-

tions are in addition to, vary from, or alter representations made by the seller,
such a rule is proper. However, the language could be interpreted to mean that
even in cases where a seller makes a factual representation in reliance on the
same or substantially similar representations made by the manufacturer, the seller
may not recover indemnity. If applied to this extent, the rule would be unduly
harsh. When making a representation that is the same as that of the manufacturer and in reliance on information or representations made by the manufacturer,
the seller should be entitled to indemnity.
A problem related to indemnity may occur in the intersection, if any, between
the statute regulating joint and several liability and apportionment of fault among
co-tortfeasors 335 and the Act. Is either the manufacturer or the seller jointly and
several liable with the other for the full amount or only to the extent necessary
for the plaintiff to recover fifty percent of her damages?33 The statute setting
forth the rules of joint and several liability for tort claims does not expressly
exclude products liability claims. The statute does, however, expressly treat
employer-employee defendants and principal-agent defendants as one person for
apportionment purposes. 3 7 At least one commentator has concluded that the
statute includes "common duty cases because the definition of fault in subsection
(1) is sufficiently broad to do so, and the exclusions from the statute in subsec-

328.
329.
330.
331.
332.
333.

Id.
See PART 1, supra note 2, at 420-22.
215 So. 2d 256 (Miss. 1968).
Id. at 259.
Id. at 260.
Id. at 259-60.

334. MISS. CODE ANN.§ 11-1-63(g)(i) (Supp. 1996).

335. MISS. CODE ANN. § 85-5-7 (1973).
336. Id.
337. MISS. CODE ANN. § 85-5-7(3) (1973).
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tion (6) do not cover this situation." ' 8 Presumably, the common duties of manufacturers and sellers would be among those common duty cases covered by the
statute.
If the statutory rules governing joint and several liability in tort claims govern
product liability claims, the plaintiff may not be entitled to a full recovery from a
seller unless the seller is one hundred percent at fault. In other cases, the seller
would be entitled to apportionment, and the joint and several liability would be
limited to fifty percent of the plaintiff's recoverable damages. In the case where
the seller is not at fault, the seller would be entitled to recover indemnity under the
Act from the manufacturer whatever the seller was condemned to pay in damages,
presumably an amount no more than fifty percent of the plaintiff's harm. In a
case where both the seller and the manufacturer were at fault, such as where each
knew or should have known of the danger in a warnings case, joint and several liability would be limited under the joint and several liability statute to fifty percent
of the plaintiff's recoverable damages with several liability for the remainder as
apportioned by the fact finder. If both manufacturer and seller are parties in such
a claim, contribution would be available between them. If one is not a party to the
plaintiff's claim, the answer is not clear as to a right of contribution. 3 9
In order to assert a claim for indemification, the seller must give notice of the
suit within thirty days of the filing of the complaint against the seller.3 4 The
notice rule is unduly harsh and may lead to unreasonable denial of claims for
indemnity. Requiring reasonable notice of an indemnity claim is proper in order
to protect the rights of the manufacturer. However, the requirement of notice
within thirty days of filing may well exclude many otherwise legitimate indemnity claims. In cases where service of process is delayed more than thirty days
from filing and the seller is unaware of the suit, the seller will be unable to make
an indemnity claim, even if he gives as prompt a notice as possible. Manufacturers stand to unjustly benefit from retailers and wholesalers by an unreasonable time bar to indemnity claims. A better rule would require prompt notice
after service of process or actual notice of the suit.
VI. CONCLUSION

The Mississippi Products Liability Act of 1993 is an act that is flawed and in
need of careful revision. Despite its proponents' stated purpose to bring stability
and certainty to the law, to improve the climate for Mississippi business, and to
bring fairness to products liability law, it may well have done the opposite. Its
meaning is uncertain and vague throughout, from its lack of definitions to the
tests of design defect to the liability of non-manufacturer sellers and their indemnity rights. The Act may well deprive deserving claimants of remedies traditionally granted under tort law.

338. H. Wesley Williams, III, Comment, 1989 Tort "Reform" in Mississippi: Modification of Joint and
Several Liability and the Adoption of ComparativeContribution, 13 Miss. C. L. Rev. 133, 154-55 (1992).
339. Id. at 168.
340. MIss. CODE ANN. § I l-l-63(g)(ii) (Supp. 1996).
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Neither plaintiffs nor defendants can know with any degree of confidence what
the Act does or what the legislature intended. Businesses and consumers are left
without clear guidance as to their duties and rights. They are left without legislative revision, to face what may be years of uncertainty and confusion. Litigation
costs are likely to increase, rather than decrease, because of the necessity of trial
motions and briefs debating the application of the Act as well as appeals to
obtain authoritative interpretations of the Act.
The movement of the Act toward negligence for design and warnings cases,
while retaining strict liability in deviation defect and express warranty cases, is
well within the national trends and in keeping with the recommendations of most
scholars in the field. Thus, the basic structure or policy of the Act is sound.
Nevertheless, the Act is in need of careful revision in order to accomplish the
goals of certainty and fairness. The Act should state clearly whether it is intended to provide a unified theory of liability. It should define clearly its terms. The
scope of coverage should be clearly deliniated, including the status of used products and non-seller commerical distributors. Bystanders should be protected
under the Act. Property interests should be expressly protected as well as persons. Purely economic interests should be handled fairly, whether under the Act
or by traditional implied warranties. The test for defective design should eliminate language that would support an open and obvious defense as a complete bar
to recovery. The indemity provision should contain a fairer notice requirement.
The liability of non-manufacturer sellers should be expressly detailed. The people and businesses of Mississippi deserve clear and fair laws. The current Act is
neither clear nor fair as written.

